rec.games.trading-cards.jyhad

Alternate "Risk Incentivizing" VP Allocation Proposal

45 messages from 9 participants · 09 October 2007 – 19 October 2007
original thread on Google Groups

nys...@cs.com

In my other thread ("A Better [?] Tournament Scoring System") I argued that we no longer needed a victory point allocation system that is structured to incentivize risk, since the game win system already achieves this, and in a manner that completely eclipses any vp-related incentive of the current system. For those who are unconvinced by this argument, and feel that more still needs to be done to encourage players to make progress towards ending games, I offer the following alternate proposal: 1. Victory points are allocated as per the standard rules, except that when a game is called for time, each player still in the game at time out receives a full victory point. 3. A Game Win is given to the player with more victory points than any other player, except that in a game called for time, a player with less than 3 victory points cannot receive a game win. (In completed games, it is still possible to win with 2 victory points, provided no other player has 2 victory points). 4. Each player receives a "table score" for each game based on his victory point total for each game. Each player with 1 victory point for a game receives a "table score" of 0.2 for that game. Each player with 2 victory points receives "table score" of 1.5 for that game. Otherwise, one's "table score" for a game is identical to one's victory points. 5. In determining tournament ranking, the total of one's victory scores is used in place of total victory points (ie. is used to order the ranking of those players with an equal number of game wins). ----------------------------- Unlike the current VP allocation system, this proposal never has the effect of altering the relative table ranking of players in a game. Game winners are never created who would not have been winners under the standard rules, nor under the standard rules paradigm; and people who would be Game Winners under the standard rules are never denied the game win here. In tournaments, this system offers a "risk incentive" in preliminary rounds to players who have not yet scored an oust, by giving them so little to lose (minus 0.2 ts if ousted) versus what they have to gain (plus 1.3 ts if they oust). I have focussed the incentive at this level, since it is at this that level that there is no immediate prospect of gaining or losing a game win. Hence, it is only at this level that "table-score" considerations are likely to influence player behavior. It offers less of a table-score incentive to those who already have 1 oust (minus 1.3 if ousted versus plus 1.5 if they score a second oust). But offering table-score incentives at this level would be pointless, since at this stage, the lure of a game win will be a far more powerful consideration. The Game Win one might earn from a second oust is worth more than any table score. Similarly, no effort is made here to offer further game finishing incentives to a player who already has 2 ousts under his belt. This could be done (by, for instance, making 4 vp worth a table score of 6 or more) but was avoided for two reasons: 1) the risk of losing the game win would outweigh any table score bribe one could possibly offer; and 2) continuing escalation of the table score unduly increases the advantage of being seated at a 5-player table. Also, it seems to me perfectly acceptable that a person with 2 ousts should keep the game win provided only he can make it to time out. In situations like this, it is his opponents, who under this proposal have little to lose and much to gain, who have little to lose by any desperate measures to sieze the leaders crown and finish the game on their own terms. "Table Splitting" becomes even less attractive than it already is under the game win system. A 3/2 split is now a 3/1.5 split. A 5-way tie grants 0.2 to each player (regardless of the method used for obtaining it -- time out, withdrawals, or 5-way simultaneous ousts).

Orpheus

> 1. Victory points are allocated as per the standard rules, except > that when a game is called for time, each player still in the game at > time out receives a full victory point. Which is an incentive to time out. Where is th .2 ?? > 3. A Game Win is given to the player with more victory points than > any other player, except that in a game called for time, a player with > less than 3 victory points cannot receive a game win. (In completed > games, it is still possible to win with 2 victory points, provided no > other player has 2 victory points). This is uselessly complicating matters. "You need X pts but you need more if...". No, not good. > 4. Each player receives a "table score" for each game based on his > victory point total for each game. Each player with 1 victory point > for a game receives a "table score" of 0.2 for that game. Each player > with 2 victory points receives "table score" of 1.5 for that game. > Otherwise, one's "table score" for a game is identical to one's > victory points. Why change the table points system ? > 5. In determining tournament ranking, the total of one's victory > scores is used in place of total victory points (ie. is used to order > the ranking of those players with an equal number of game wins). No, seriously mate, your system has more disadvantages than advantages, it doesn't give the incentive you'd like, and it is wayyyyyyyyyyy too complicated !! Too many rules, exceptions, exceptions to the exceptions... Just forget it. Of course OMMV, they obviously do. -- Orpheus -------------------- "Never Kill Again To Live Another Golden Day", the James Bond movie you'll never see.

nys...@cs.com

On Oct 9, 7:06 am, "Orpheus" <orpheusDEADSPAM...@free.fr> wrote: > > 1. Victory points are allocated as per the standard rules, except > > that when a game is called for time, each player still in the game at > > time out receives a full victory point. > > Which is an incentive to time out. No. Since the survival award is identical in finished and unfinished games, no incentive here is offered one way or the other. I have, admittedly, removed the game-ending incentive (or risk incentive) of the current VEKN rules. That is why I referred to this as an ALTERNATE proposal. It also provides a risk incentive, but uses a different mechanism -- one that does not distort the reward structure of the standard rules. I was tempted to word the above proposal as follows: "Each player starts the game with 1 vp. He gains a vp every time he scores an oust. He loses a vp if he is ousted. No other adjustments are ever made." But I did that, silly people would falsely accuse me of changing the standard rules, because they are unable to see that it is merely the same system, worded differently. > Where is th .2 ?? What a strange question. You apparently know about the 0.2, so you apparently finished reading my post. So ... why ask? Perhaps it would clarify things for you if I stated that, if the full vp you earn for being alive at time out (or alive at the end of the game, or withdrawn, etc.) turns out to be the ONLY victory point you earn, it gets effectively reduced to 0.2 for tournament scoring purposes. > > 3. A Game Win is given to the player with more victory points than > > any other player, except that in a game called for time, a player with > > less than 3 victory points cannot receive a game win. (In completed > > games, it is still possible to win with 2 victory points, provided no > > other player has 2 victory points). > > This is uselessly complicating matters. "You need X pts but you need more > if...". No, not good. Fine. In that case just give the game win to the single player with the most victory points. That's even simpler than what we have now. I just worry that my critics will complain that the above does not do enough to encourage players to complete games. This is, after all addressed to those who insist we still need an risk-promoting game- finishing incentive beyond what the game win system provides, and who oppose my argument that the game win system achieves this adequately. > > 4. Each player receives a "table score" for each game based on his > > victory point total for each game. Each player with 1 victory point > > for a game receives a "table score" of 0.2 for that game. Each player > > with 2 victory points receives "table score" of 1.5 for that game. > > Otherwise, one's "table score" for a game is identical to one's > > victory points. > > Why change the table points system ? The tournament points system remains unchanged and is used as a 3rd tier tie breaker, like now. "Table Score" is used in place of "Victory Points". > > 5. In determining tournament ranking, the total of one's victory > > scores is used in place of total victory points (ie. is used to order > > the ranking of those players with an equal number of game wins). > > No, seriously mate, your system has more disadvantages than advantages, [...] Aside from "it's too complicated", what are the disadvantages? > it > doesn't give the incentive you'd like, It most certainly does. It provides exactly the incentives I like. > and it is wayyyyyyyyyyy too > complicated !! Too many rules, exceptions, exceptions to the exceptions... In that case, I refer to to my original proposal, which I prefer.

Orpheus

>> Where is th .2 ?? > > What a strange question. You apparently know about the 0.2, so you > apparently finished reading my post. So ... why ask? > > Perhaps it would clarify things for you if I stated that, if the full > vp you earn for being alive at time out (or alive at the end of the > game, or withdrawn, etc.) turns out to be the ONLY victory point you > earn, it gets effectively reduced to 0.2 for tournament scoring > purposes. Loooool. No, I mean you have a paragraph .1 , a paragraph .3 ... Whatever happened to .2 ? Is it only in the original post ?

nys...@cs.com

On Oct 9, 11:01 am, "Orpheus" <orpheusDEADSPAM...@free.fr> wrote: > Loooool. No, I mean you have a paragraph .1 , a paragraph .3 ... Whatever > happened to .2 ? Is it only in the original post ? The paragraphs were misnumbered. As far as I can tell, I left nothing out.

Orpheus

>> Loooool. No, I mean you have a paragraph .1 , a paragraph .3 ... Whatever >> happened to .2 ? Is it only in the original post ? > > The paragraphs were misnumbered. As far as I can tell, I left nothing > out. Just to see if I was following, uh ? Well, I was ! ;-) But alas I really don't have the time to go deeper inside your logic, I'll leave that to others. Suffice it to say that, although I agree that some things need to be changed for the better, I'm not convinced by what I read as of now. -- "All Hail the Lords of the Night !" Orpheus

nys...@cs.com

On Oct 9, 11:14 am, "Orpheus" <orpheusDEADSPAM...@free.fr> wrote: > But alas I really don't have the time to go deeper inside your logic, I'll > leave that to others. I am deeply disappointed that you lacked the time to grace my proposal with your brilliant analysis. I hope the others, to whom you have abandoned the task, will be at least half as insightful, but it does not seem likely.

Orpheus

>> But alas I really don't have the time to go deeper inside your logic, >> I'll >> leave that to others. > > I am deeply disappointed that you lacked the time to grace my proposal > with your brilliant analysis. I hope the others, to whom you have > abandoned the task, will be at least half as insightful, but it does > not seem likely. If that is half as as ironic as it sounds, sorry you take it that way. I didn't mean to sound as if I detained any sort of truth. Just : I am working (although at home) so I can only read and type that much, and your proposal is quite complex ; I made a first answer as I was reading it, I might have missed some of your points, and won't be able to go over them as thoroughly as necessary to give you better arguments, or better understand yours. That's all I meant, without any sort of vanity. Hope it's clear now. [ quoted text not captured ]

Frederick Scott

"Orpheus" <orpheusDE...@free.fr> wrote in message news:470b60b1$0$26751$426a...@news.free.fr... >> 4. Each player receives a "table score" for each game based on his >> victory point total for each game. Each player with 1 victory point >> for a game receives a "table score" of 0.2 for that game. Each player >> with 2 victory points receives "table score" of 1.5 for that game. >> Otherwise, one's "table score" for a game is identical to one's >> victory points. > > Why change the table points system ? Because John is angling to make game wins gained by getting to two ousts and just sitting (or, alternatively, just barely getting to the second oust before time) equal in value to someone who was last-man-standing with two ousts in a game that finished. It's more promotion of slow decks as being the equal of fast decks. It punishes slow decks for being slow less than the existing system, which to me is a negative. The notion of giving time out survivors less reward is sort of interesting but doesn't strike me as being very important. In my experience, the thing that contributes to time outs in order of priority is: 1) Unfortunate metagame issues which prevent any deck at the table from being effective at attacking its particular prey. (This includes unfortunate deck ordering factors. People can only play the cards they draw.) 2) People arriving at the table with slow-developing decks - lots of intercept, bloat, combat defense but no offense. 3) People not playing as aggressively as they could. (Maybe I'm forgetting other factors. I think almost everything can be described #1 is the worst contributor but something that we can't control. Bad random deck ordering by some of the player also contributes in the same way/looks like the same thing. #2 is something we can control and should, to the extent the scoring system can, without warping it in other ways too badly. #3 is kind of variable. But usually in the situations where someone would care about the difference between .2 VP and .5 VP (the change John is making), they really don't have any reasonable chance of scoring an oust anyway so it doesn't matter. IMHO, rewarding people more for arriving at the table with slow decks will make more of a difference and that difference will tend to snowball, as players see more advantages to the surviving/building-up strategy that they'll decide _they_ need to adopt it as well in order to compete in the endgame. Eventually, glaciers will move faster than VtES tournament games. OK, I admit it, that last sentence is hyperbole. But I don't think the change is good. Fred

nys...@cs.com

On Oct 9, 2:37 pm, "Frederick Scott" <nos...@no.spam.dot.com> wrote: > "Orpheus" <orpheusDEADSPAM...@free.fr> wrote in message > news:470b60b1$0$26751$426a...@news.free.fr... > >> 4. Each player receives a "table score" for each game based on his > >> victory point total for each game. Each player with 1 victory point > >> for a game receives a "table score" of 0.2 for that game. Each player > >> with 2 victory points receives "table score" of 1.5 for that game. > >> Otherwise, one's "table score" for a game is identical to one's > >> victory points. > > > Why change the table points system ? > > Because John is angling to make game wins gained by getting to two > ousts and just sitting (or, alternatively, just barely getting to > the second oust before time) equal in value to someone who was > last-man-standing with two ousts in a game that finished. I would like to make it clear to everyone that I never authorized Frederick Scott to express my opinions for me. He is also not doing a very good job. The above is not the purpose of the proposal -- though, it so happens, it is one of its features. A person who scores two ousts gets the same score under this proposal regardless of whether the game finishes or not. I consider this rational because, in each case, the player in question has made the exact same contribution to ending the game -- he has ousted two players. In contrast, however, this proposal more severely penalizes (compared to the current system) the remaining players -- the ones who ousted nobody and who have made NO contribution to ending the game. And once again, it applied that penalty consistently -- regardless of whether the game ends or not. In the post that started this thread, I explained my reasons for not attempting to give additional incentives to those who had already scored two ousts. They need not be repeated here, except to point out that they had nothing to do with a desire to promote slow games. > It's more promotion of slow decks as being the equal of fast decks. > It punishes slow decks for being slow less than the existing system, > which to me is a negative. Absolutely false. This proposal is explicitly intended as a concession to opponents who say we need to promote fast games. It is intended to speed up games, not slow them down, but means to do so in a manner that will not cause the sort of "distortions" that I so laboriously elaborated on in my last post addressed to Frederick Scott. It was clearly stated in the post that started this thread that the purpose of the instant proposal is to promote faster games. Frederick Scott, however, has consistently claimed to know my opinions better than I do, and is calling me a liar once again. > The notion of giving time out survivors > less reward is sort of interesting but doesn't strike me as being > very important. This is precisely why my instant proposal gets rid of that worthless technique, and provides incentives that is likely to be more effective.

James Coupe

In message <1191916273.8...@57g2000hsv.googlegroups.com>, nys...@cs.com writes: >4. Each player receives a "table score" for each game based on his >victory point total for each game. Each player with 1 victory point >for a game receives a "table score" of 0.2 for that game. Each player >with 2 victory points receives "table score" of 1.5 for that game. >Otherwise, one's "table score" for a game is identical to one's >victory points. Inherently problematic. A tournament judge is empowered to award partial VP to rectify a problem on a table, where appropriate - for example, to make up for a player who has to drop mid-round ("OMG my wife has gone into labour two months early!") or who is DQ-ed. See 20. Definition of Penalties in the Judges' Guide. -- James Coupe PGP Key: 0x5D623D5D YOU ARE IN ERROR. EBD690ECD7A1FB457CA2 NO-ONE IS SCREAMING. 13D7E668C3695D623D5D THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION.

nys...@cs.com

On Oct 9, 12:11 pm, "Orpheus" <orpheusDEADSPAM...@free.fr> wrote: > I didn't mean to sound as if I detained any sort of truth. Just : I am > working (although at home) so I can only read and type that much, and your > proposal is quite complex ; I made a first answer as I was reading it, I > might have missed some of your points, and won't be able to go over them as > thoroughly as necessary to give you better arguments, or better understand > yours. That's all I meant, without any sort of vanity. Hope it's clear now. Okay. Sorry if I sounded snarky. I'll just wait here now for the resk of the hecklers.

nys...@cs.com

On Oct 9, 4:44 pm, James Coupe <ja...@zephyr.org.uk> wrote: > In message <1191916273.879564.193...@57g2000hsv.googlegroups.com>, > nyst...@cs.com writes: > >4. Each player receives a "table score" for each game based on his > >victory point total for each game. Each player with 1 victory point > >for a game receives a "table score" of 0.2 for that game. Each player > >with 2 victory points receives "table score" of 1.5 for that game. > >Otherwise, one's "table score" for a game is identical to one's > >victory points. > > Inherently problematic. A tournament judge is empowered to award > partial VP to rectify a problem on a table, where appropriate - for > example, to make up for a player who has to drop mid-round ("OMG my wife > has gone into labour two months early!") or who is DQ-ed. > > See 20. Definition of Penalties in the Judges' Guide. Well, this is at least a perceptive objection. You are right in observing that my proposal has minimal use for half victory points. The most an extra half victory point would accomplish (under this proposal) would be to declare that if this player would tie with another player, he wins instead. But I really don't think judges will be completely hamstrung in dealing with such situations -- not much more so than they are already, at least. If the purpose of the half victory point is to compenstate a player with an in-game advantage -- one that makes him more likely to win -- then ... why not give him pool instead? And if the purpose of the half victory point is to reward him with a higher tournament score, why not give him a bonus to the "table score" instead?

Frederick Scott

<nys...@cs.com> wrote in message news:1191963674.3...@g4g2000hsf.googlegroups.com... > On Oct 9, 2:37 pm, "Frederick Scott" <nos...@no.spam.dot.com> wrote: >> "Orpheus" <orpheusDEADSPAM...@free.fr> wrote in message >> news:470b60b1$0$26751$426a...@news.free.fr... >> >> 4. Each player receives a "table score" for each game based on his >> >> victory point total for each game. Each player with 1 victory point >> >> for a game receives a "table score" of 0.2 for that game. Each player >> >> with 2 victory points receives "table score" of 1.5 for that game. >> >> Otherwise, one's "table score" for a game is identical to one's >> >> victory points. >> >> > Why change the table points system ? >> >> Because John is angling to make game wins gained by getting to two >> ousts and just sitting (or, alternatively, just barely getting to >> the second oust before time) equal in value to someone who was >> last-man-standing with two ousts in a game that finished. > > I would like to make it clear to everyone that I never authorized > Frederick Scott to express my opinions for me. He is also not doing a > very good job. > > The above is not the purpose of the proposal -- though, it so happens, > it is one of its features. A person who scores two ousts gets the > same score under this proposal regardless of whether the game finishes > or not. I consider this rational because, in each case, the player in > question has made the exact same contribution to ending the game -- he > has ousted two players. The distinction between this effect being a "purpose" vs. simply being "one of its features" is without substance, especially when you turn around and defend its existance. And the issue is not whether an arbritary value assigned to a behavior can be defended as 'rational' is likewise pointless. It's an expression of desirability, not a logical argument. The question is whether it's desirable or not. And your statement about "contribution to ending the game" is fallacious in the exact same sense that Jeff Kuta's was: causing ousts before a game ends isn't the sole measure of contribution in resolving a game. There is no such measure except for one thing: did the player play a game which didn't resolve. That's why there's only one penalty for failing to resolve a game and it's applied to all the players who survive a game to time. Just counting ousts doesn't take into account whether a player played aggressively and used speedy methods to oust or conservatively and used slow methods. Using the former is desirable and the latter undesirable towards insuring games end more often. An oust that required a lot of turns and time and occurred just before time was called should not be counted as equal to one that took 20 minutes and a small number of turns. I'm not saying players shouldn't have their choice of which route to take. But the current system does a nice job of marginally penalizing slow and deliberate decks and thus encouraging faster player and more resolution of games, all else being equal. It's a misrepresentation to suggest simply encouraging ousts does anything in this regard. > This proposal is explicitly intended as a > concession to opponents who say we need to promote fast games. It is > intended to speed up games, not slow them down, but means to do so in > a manner that will not cause the sort of "distortions" that I so > laboriously elaborated on in my last post addressed to Frederick > Scott. Asserting somtehing is a distortion based on some formula players needn't care about in reality and then suggesting it's therefore somehow "evil" is also a semantic form of argumentation - as is attempting to suggest someone else's method of counterargument amounts to calling one a "liar" when all they're trying to do is demonstrate that your arguments are not what you claim. People shouldn't care whether a scoring system is a 'distortion' or not. They should only care whether, in the end, it values beahvior they like to the degree they like it. Fred

Tetragrammaton

nys...@cs.com wrote: > In my other thread ("A Better [?] Tournament Scoring System") I argued > that we no longer needed a victory point allocation system that is > structured to incentivize risk, since the game win system already > achieves this, and in a manner that completely eclipses any vp-related > incentive of the current system. For those who are unconvinced by > this argument, and feel that more still needs to be done to encourage > players to make progress towards ending games, I offer the following > alternate proposal: Other than going with complications, the best solution at hand for final is: - the final round has to be played for GW (no matter what starting seeds are), as with other rounds - disallow prizes as part of deals - establish conditional prize for final GWinner only, at the same time with (small) flat prizes for all the other finalist. that would result in the final being played as much as the other preliminary rounds (play for GW, no other consideration/incentive taken outside the current game) my two cents Emiliano, italian NC www.italybynight.org

James Coupe

In message <1191974928....@50g2000hsm.googlegroups.com>, nys...@cs.com writes: >If the purpose of the half victory point is to compenstate a player >with an in-game advantage -- one that makes him more likely to win -- >then ... why not give him pool instead? Because that may not be an appropriate way to rectify a particular table, under the particular circumstances of that table, the state of play, things that have gone very wrong earlier without being noticed, and so on. Pool may be part of the solution, but it's not there to give the player an "advantage" per se - it's there to try to rectify whatever's gone wrong. If you could, you'd go back in time and replay the appropriate wrong bits without the wrong. But you can't, so you try to bodge the game appropriately. >And if the purpose of the half victory point is to reward him with a >higher tournament score, why not give him a bonus to the "table score" >instead? Possible, yes. What table score figure is equivalent to a player ending the game with 0.5 VP currently, which I might award where a player being DQ-ed takes an excessive amount of time and I need to reward several players to make up for it? DQ-ed player kicks over table, players have to find their cards, rescue them from coke etc., and there isn't enough time to replay the round because it was an hour in, and the player was a four player table? What about when I want to give that to a player who already has 1VP? Your "table score" has a very odd curve to it - the first VP is worth very little, the second VP is worth a lot, the third VP is worth more, but VPs four and five aren't worth as much. So where exactly does 1.5 VP fit in there? 1.25 VP? And a player who chooses to split a table 3/2 or 4/1 is in a better position with your situation - a Table Win and 3 points, and the 2VP has no TW and 1.5 points, vs the current TW and 3, vs no TW and 2, or 4/0.2 instead of 4/1. That doesn't really seem to incentivize taking a risk for a sweep, because 5/0 is no better than now, if you can find a cosy deal that will help and a player who accepts that it's better than nothing. [ quoted text not captured ]

Oko

On 10 loka, 10:44, "Tetragrammaton" <nos...@none.com> wrote: [ quoted text not captured ] Alas, that still wont remove the problem, which is more deeply rooted. Well, in my opinion it is. Tie-breakers exist, and people know what they are. Namely, seeding. A good incentive to remove stalling for timeout victories in finals, is to find a way of determinating the winner without the need for tie- breaker. It would also be a very very good motivator for GW's to settle the winner with a coin-toss. Sure, it's not the perfect method and Orpheus would quit the game, among others. But it'd sure as hell make dead certain that people would play for the GW. I suspect no one would enjoy facing Lady Fortuna in coin-toss, instead preferring to play aggressively for the win. That'll never happen, though. Shame, in it's own sense.

nys...@cs.com

James Coupe wrote: > And a player who chooses to split a table 3/2 or 4/1 is in a better > position with your situation - a Table Win and 3 points, and the > 2VP has no TW and 1.5 points, vs the current TW and 3, vs no TW > and 2, or 4/0.2 instead of 4/1. Yes, but it will not effect their behavior. Let's look at each example: 3/2 splits: Let's start with the case of the player with 2 ousts (who will get the full value of his 3 vp if he avoids getting ousted). Your criticism (or observations) somehow implies I *should* do something to give him an incentive to make risky forward moves. But what can I possibly offer him to make it worth his while? If he gets ousted, he loses the game win. What can I offer him to make up for that risk except ... an extra game win, or better yet, two extra game wins. Are we going to start handing out multiple game wins per game? Because that's all one could possibly offer that would have any meaning. My system accepts the inevitable, realises one cannot use victory point incentives to bribe a player who has scored exactly 2 ousts, and instead focusses on those it *can* bribe. In this case, the bribe is offered to the two *other* players, both of whom have virtually nothing to gain from the status quo (3.0, 0.2, 0.2). They are the ones who are bribed into taking risks. This can have one of two effects. Either their risky ventures will pay off, and they will put so much pressure on the Leader that (on the principle that the best defense is sometimes a good offense -- do unto others before they can do unto you) he is forced to try to defeat his enemies before they defeat him. Or else, their desperate efforts at victory will only lay them so wide open to the Leader that he finds he just cannot pass up the ousting opportunities that fall in his lap (after all -- one more oust will make his victory entirely secure). 4/1 splits In this case, the Leader has no fear of losing the game win -- he will get it even if ousted. So now his risk calculation is exactly even -- he stands to get 1 point if he ousts, lose one 1 point if he gets ousted. I explained in my original post why granting incentives to the leader would be bad. It would potentially make a victory at a 5-player tables too valuable compared to a victory at a 4-player tables. Nonetheless, my system does create incentives for conflict -- not by offering them to the leader -- but by offering them to the other player. As above, the leader has every reason to offer a deal, but the other player has no reason to accept. What good to him is a measley 0.2 points if he has *any* remote chance of getting 1.5 points? He might as well go out fighting, and that probably means that either his gamble will pay off and he will score his first oust, or that by his desperate risk taking strategies he he will turn himself into an easy meal. I am amused by the idea that you think we need to incentize risk taking to prevent 4/1 time outs. Such games are as close to finished as a game can possibly be without actually being finished. A game winner has already been firmly and irrevocably determined. I think the leader will virtually always want to put the icing on the cake and go for the sweep -- but so what if he doesn't? > That doesn't really seem to incentivize taking a risk for a sweep, > because 5/0 is no better than now, if you can find a cosy deal > that will help and a player who accepts that it's better than > nothing. Ah, but it takes 2 to tango. The leader has every reason to offer a "cozy" 3.0, 0.2, 0.2 deal to his 2 remaining enemies, or a "cozy" 4.0, 0.2 deal to one remaining enemy -- but what possible reason would the opponents have to accept? This "cozy" bed has only room for one. If their position is truly hopeless, they might accept the deal -- yes -- but in that case, why is the offer being made? A 3.0, 1.5 deal, to a single remaining enemy with 1 oust, is a little more "cozy" -- except that, by refusing the "cozy" deal and going forward, the tables can be entirely reversed. By accepting the deal, player 2 avoids the risk of losing 1.3 points. By risking this 1.3 points (compared to time out), and going forward, he stands a chance of getting (compared to time out) -- not merely the measly +1.5 points which more than evenly balances balances what he is risking -- but also a GAME WIN. My system creates a situation where any deal that is good for one player will be bad for the other. Hence, maximum aggression and conflict will be the norm.

Tetragrammaton

Oko wrote: > On 10 loka, 10:44, "Tetragrammaton" <nos...@none.com> wrote: >> nyst...@cs.com wrote: >>> In my other thread ("A Better [?] Tournament Scoring System") I >>> argued that we no longer needed a victory point allocation system >>> that is structured to incentivize risk, since the game win system >>> already achieves this, and in a manner that completely eclipses any >>> vp-related incentive of the current system. For those who are >>> unconvinced by this argument, and feel that more still needs to be >>> done to encourage players to make progress towards ending games, I >>> offer the following alternate proposal: >> >> Other than going with complications, the best solution at hand for >> final is: >> >> - the final round has to be played for GW (no matter what starting >> seeds are), as with other rounds >> - disallow prizes as part of deals >> - establish conditional prize for final GWinner only, at the same >> time with (small) flat prizes for all the other finalist. >> >> that would result in the final being played as much as the other >> preliminary rounds (play for GW, no other consideration/incentive >> taken outside the current game) >> >> my two cents >> >> Emiliano, italian NCwww.italybynight.org > > Alas, that still wont remove the problem, The problem is that "every finalist" can play maximizing prizes instead of placement, in the very moment one is in the position of not "winning" the tournament any longer and can't reasonably risk to place at an higher placement than his/her current seed. The problem is that the top seed finalist will usually try to hang the stale, bringing it to time limit. This under the current "rulings" for finals. If the final round would to be played per-GW (changing the score system, at the same time, besides the conditional prizes and the rest) as the other previous ones, then those problems would evaporate. No need to add randomness to a game that has already so many unpredictables variables in it. > Well, in my opinion it is. > Tie-breakers exist, and people know what they are. Namely, seeding. > A good incentive to remove stalling for timeout victories in finals, > is to find a way of determinating the winner without the need for tie- > breaker. > > It would also be a very very good motivator for GW's to settle the > winner with a coin-toss. Sure, it's not the perfect method and Orpheus > would quit the game, among others. But it'd sure as hell make dead > certain that people would play for the GW. I suspect no one would > enjoy facing Lady Fortuna in coin-toss, instead preferring to play > aggressively for the win. This is just crazy, because you can't randomly assign a tournament "winner" by fortune. Adding an element of randomness would not incentive players for not trying to tye the final round - to the worst, it would incentive them in more prize-splitting deals ("if i coin toss for first then i give half of prize to you, and if you do then make the same with me...let's tie the game"

nys...@cs.com

On Oct 10, 3:44 am, "Tetragrammaton" <nos...@none.com> wrote: > Other than going with complications, the best solution at > hand for final is: I had best make clear that my proposal has nothing to do with finals. It is designed to offer incentives for risk-taking in preliminary rounds, much as is done in the preliminary rounds of World Cup Soccer. It has no effect on a final round. I know there is a hullabaloo going on about deal making in final rounds, but that is really a totally separate question. The only part of your post with relevence to preliminary rounds is the following: > - disallow prizes as part of deals Surely, that is already forbidden. Offering anything of value to another player constitutes a bribe, yes?

LSJ

[ quoted text not captured ] http://www.white-wolf.com/vtes/index.php?line=veknjudgesguide Section 161. Bribery

Tetragrammaton

nys...@cs.com wrote: > On Oct 10, 3:44 am, "Tetragrammaton" <nos...@none.com> wrote: >> Other than going with complications, the best solution at >> hand for final is: > > I had best make clear that my proposal has nothing to do with finals. > It is designed to offer incentives for risk-taking in preliminary > rounds, much as is done in the preliminary rounds of World Cup > Soccer. It has no effect on a final round. > > I know there is a hullabaloo going on about deal making in final > rounds, but that is really a totally separate question. > IMHO, actual GW rules in the previous rounds are just fine. There's no evidence, to me, of players trying to "not win" or to stale otherwise the game in the preliminary rounds. So far, i witnessed and read of such beaviours just in final rounds. > The only part of your post with relevence to preliminary rounds is the > following: > >> - disallow prizes as part of deals > > Surely, that is already forbidden. Offering anything of value to > another player constitutes a bribe, yes? In the final round you can offer prizes as part of deals, yes. In the preliminary ones no, you can't

Blooded Sand

On Oct 10, 7:45 pm, LSJ <vtes...@white-wolf.com> wrote: [ quoted text not captured ] Except as insofar as prize split deals are considered part of the game, and thus offering a player something of value, that is not bribery, according to you

James Coupe

In message <1192041158.0...@57g2000hsv.googlegroups.com>, [ quoted text not captured ] I think you missed the point. LSJ pointed to the section of the penalty guidelines which explains *exactly the point you just raised*. It's not an "except". It's restating exactly what LSJ just pointed out. [ quoted text not captured ]

Frederick Scott

"Oko" <Oko...@gmail.com> wrote in message news:1192020261.6...@19g2000hsx.googlegroups.com... > On 10 loka, 10:44, "Tetragrammaton" <nos...@none.com> wrote: >> Other than going with complications, the best solution at hand for final is: ... > Alas, that still wont remove the problem, which is more deeply rooted. > Well, in my opinion it is. > Tie-breakers exist, and people know what they are. Namely, seeding. > A good incentive to remove stalling for timeout victories in finals, > is to find a way of determinating the winner without the need for tie- > breaker. I'm not sure seeding, per se, is a bad idea. I think it's a good thing that the player who did the best in the preliminary rounds get a distinct advantage in the final round. Last choice in seating is helpful but I think the seeding would be a good thing if players weren't as capable of sitting on their advantage. IMHO, the ideal answer will always be to get more empower offense and "defang" defense to a greater degree in this game than it currently is. Of course, that always risks the opposite problem: too many dull, runaway 1/2 hour sweeps. But I think there should be an effective middle ground in there somewhere. Fred

nys...@cs.com

Tetragrammaton wrote: > IMHO, actual GW rules in the previous rounds are just fine. > There's no evidence, to me, of players trying to "not win" or > to stale otherwise the game in the preliminary rounds. > So far, i witnessed and read of such beaviours just in final > rounds. Such had been my opinion. Hence my argument, in my prior thread, that we should grant a whole vp for survivors at time out, a solution more in keeping with the values of the standard rulebook -- and which would correct many distortions (compared to standard games and finished games) that resulted from the discounting of survival in unfinished games. I took the position that the GW system, by itself, was sufficient incentive for players to work towards finishing games. Certain of my opponents, however, insisted that we still needed vp incentives, and if I removed that half-vp survivor's penalty at time out, disaster and stalled games would result. So I suggested the current proposal, which I believe would reward risk taking and aggressive play far more effectively than the current system -- but without unnecessarily altering the rules of the standard game.

Tetragrammaton

nys...@cs.com wrote: > Tetragrammaton wrote: >> IMHO, actual GW rules in the previous rounds are just fine. >> There's no evidence, to me, of players trying to "not win" or >> to stale otherwise the game in the preliminary rounds. >> So far, i witnessed and read of such beaviours just in final >> rounds. > > Such had been my opinion. Hence my argument, in my prior thread, that > we should grant a whole vp for survivors at time out, a solution more > in keeping with the values of the standard rulebook -- and which would > correct many distortions (compared to standard games and finished > games) that resulted from the discounting of survival in unfinished > games. This seems a bit more complicated to do, given the fact tha the 0.5 scoring was assigned to withdraws too, that would go somewhat in contrast with this approach (withdraw/stand still with other= 0.5) > I took the position that the GW system, by itself, was > sufficient incentive for players to work towards finishing games. > Indeed, this is one the key points - and since the GW is not in the final round, that incentive isn't there. Changing the overall tournament scoring system with a "GWed" ruled final round could solve that (tournament winner would get X points - but as tournament winner and GWinner of the final round, would get X+Y points). This, of course, backed with the same approach with prizes giving (conditional prizes given only to the GWinner of the final round, flat prizes given anyway to all the finalists) E

nys...@cs.com

Tetragrammaton wrote: > This seems a bit more complicated to do, given the fact tha the 0.5 > scoring was assigned to withdraws too, that would go somewhat > in contrast with this approach (withdraw/stand still with other= > 0.5) I don't know what you mean. My proposed victory point scoring is very simple: 1 point per oust plus 1 point if you do not get ousted. Period. Withdrawals, last man standing, and standing at time out, are merely 3 ways of not being ousted, and they are all scored the same. The current withdrawal rule is distorted. Suppose their are two methuselahs left in the game. They are tied. However, they are both rendered powerless and incapable of hurting eachother (all minions in torpor and no way to get them out). Logical thing to do, under the old rules, was for one player to withdraw. This gives neither player the advantage, and they remain tied. Under the current warped rules, if one withdraws, he gives the advantage to the other player, who claims the game win.

LSJ

nys...@cs.com wrote: > The current withdrawal rule is distorted. Suppose their are two > methuselahs left in the game. They are tied. However, they are both > rendered powerless and incapable of hurting eachother (all minions in > torpor and no way to get them out). Logical thing to do, under the > old rules, was for one player to withdraw. This gives neither player > the advantage, and they remain tied. > > Under the current warped rules, if one withdraws, he gives the > advantage to the other player, who claims the game win. If they are stalemated, they can say so (and each take half for the tie). http://www.white-wolf.com/vtes/index.php?line=veknRules#sec3.6 So they remain tied.

Tetragrammaton

nys...@cs.com wrote: > Tetragrammaton wrote: >> This seems a bit more complicated to do, given the fact tha the 0.5 >> scoring was assigned to withdraws too, that would go somewhat >> in contrast with this approach (withdraw/stand still with other= >> 0.5) > > I don't know what you mean. My proposed victory point scoring is very > simple: 1 point per oust plus 1 point if you do not get ousted. > Period. That would be not an incentive for going forward, i think. As long as "surviving" would be prized with an half point more, i think players would be prone to hold backward instead (why to take risks while you get a full vp surviving, instead of 0.5 ?). I mean that incentives in playing for GW in final rounds should be taken in the form of changing the scoring system, with tournament winner getting X points, but with additional (conditional) points if he/she manages to GWin the final round (so, he/she scores at least 2 vps in final round without no-else scoring that much, or he/she manages to get 3 vps), with prizes following the same logic (conditional prizes only for the final round GWinner and flat prizes for all the finalists). > > Withdrawals, last man standing, and standing at time out, are merely 3 > ways of not being ousted, and they are all scored the same. > Not really - last man standing is worth 1 pv if you're the one remaining, so basically that is an incentive of some sort in trying to remain the last man standing at the table (ie, trying actively to risk for oust the other player remaining, that is worth 1 vp for oust +1vp for being the LMS ) I can see your point with the two remaining and one withdrawing, but with the would be 1 Vp to each at time out, that would not be an incentive at all for taking risky action, just to sit timing out the game. > The current withdrawal rule is distorted. Suppose their are two > methuselahs left in the game. They are tied. However, they are both > rendered powerless and incapable of hurting eachother (all minions in > torpor and no way to get them out). This is very unlikely to happen if not almost impossibile (in 14 years of play i never witnessed such situations) however, so at least for me isn't a valid example. > Under the current warped rules, if one withdraws, he gives the > advantage to the other player, who claims the game win. If one withdraw with two remaining yes, but only in that case (with more than two players, the predator of withdrawing players don't get a vp).

nys...@cs.com

Tetragrammaton wrote: > nys...@cs.com wrote: > > I don't know what you mean. My proposed victory point scoring > > is very simple: 1 point per oust plus 1 point if you do not get > > ousted. Period. > > That would be not an incentive for going forward, i think. > As long as "surviving" would be prized with an half point more, > i think players would be prone to hold backward instead (why to > take risks while you get a full vp surviving, instead of 0.5 ?). Because if all you do is survive, your 1 point is effectively reduced to 0.2 for tournament ranking purposes. Sheesh, man, did you not finish reading the proposal? Please read my responses to James Coupe.

Bram Vink

On 9 okt, 09:51, nyst...@cs.com wrote: > In my other thread ("A Better [?] Tournament Scoring System") I argued > that we no longer needed a victory point allocation system that is > structured to incentivize risk, since the game win system already > achieves this, and in a manner that completely eclipses any vp-related > incentive of the current system. For those who are unconvinced by > this argument, and feel that more still needs to be done to encourage > players to make progress towards ending games, I offer the following > alternate proposal: Still it is unclear. Please explain, in detail, what the problem is you're trying to fix. Why is this a problem, and what distortion are you talking about?

nys...@cs.com

[ quoted text not captured ] > So they remain tied. Hence, my earlier comment to Fred Scott that the VEKN might as well ban withdrawal, since time out and agreed-upon stalemate are adequate and alternate methods of acknowledging deadlock. The only purposes served by withdrawal now are: (1) defensive withdrawal; and (2) collusive withdrawal designed to give the other player the advantage (possibly including a game win) such as one pursuant to a secret coin-toss deal. The most legitimate of these is defensive withdrawals, which are possible. But the standard rules sought at least to minimize such withdrawals by preventing them in situations where one's opponent could demonstrate any power to harm you whatsoever. Though defensive withdrawals are permitted where possible, I suspect that Garfields general intent was that, if you need to withdraw to avoid being ousted, you ought to just get ousted. Defensive withdrawal was, I think, merely a side effect of a rule whose intended primary function was to acknowledge and score a deadlock.

nys...@cs.com

[ quoted text not captured ] Please see the other thread, particularly my last response to Fred Scott, in which I discuss exactly what I mean by distortion ... in detail.

LSJ

nys...@cs.com wrote: > LSJ wrote: >> nys...@cs.com wrote: >>> The current withdrawal rule is distorted. Suppose their are two >>> methuselahs left in the game. They are tied. However, they are >>> both rendered powerless and incapable of hurting eachother (all >>> minions in torpor and no way to get them out). Logical thing to >>> do, under the old rules, was for one player to withdraw. This >>> gives neither player the advantage, and they remain tied. >>> >>> Under the current warped rules, if one withdraws, he gives the >>> advantage to the other player, who claims the game win. >> If they are stalemated, they can say so (and each take half for >> the tie). http://www.white-wolf.com/vtes/index.php?line=veknRules#sec3.6 > >> So they remain tied. > > Hence, my earlier comment to Fred Scott that the VEKN might as well > ban withdrawal, since time out and agreed-upon stalemate are adequate > and alternate methods of acknowledging deadlock. In deadlock, sure. But it is also useful in non-deadlock. In 3p, with one Methuselah unable to go forward and yet capable of mounting a defense against xer predator for a turn, xe can withdraw and let the remaining two Methuselahs finish normally. Also the case in 2p. If one player can mount an offense, but not right now, while the other is adrift and unable to do anything except wait to be ousted, the second would prefer to withdraw. > The only purposes served by withdrawal now are: (1) defensive > withdrawal; and (2) collusive withdrawal designed to give the other > player the advantage (possibly including a game win) such as one > pursuant to a secret coin-toss deal. > > The most legitimate of these is defensive withdrawals, which are > possible. But the standard rules sought at least to minimize such > withdrawals by preventing them in situations where one's opponent > could demonstrate any power to harm you whatsoever. Though defensive > withdrawals are permitted where possible, I suspect that Garfields > general intent was that, if you need to withdraw to avoid being > ousted, you ought to just get ousted. Not at all. If that were his intent, there would be no withdrawal rule. > Defensive withdrawal was, I > think, merely a side effect of a rule whose intended primary function > was to acknowledge and score a deadlock. No. Anyone can write a much simpler rule to acknowledge and score a deadlock.

nys...@cs.com

On Oct 11, 7:57 am, LSJ <vtes...@white-wolf.com> wrote: > nyst...@cs.com wrote: > > LSJ wrote: > >> nyst...@cs.com wrote: > >>> The current withdrawal rule is distorted. Suppose their are two > >>> methuselahs left in the game. They are tied. However, they are > >>> both rendered powerless and incapable of hurting eachother (all > >>> minions in torpor and no way to get them out). Logical thing to > >>> do, under the old rules, was for one player to withdraw. This > >>> gives neither player the advantage, and they remain tied. > > >>> Under the current warped rules, if one withdraws, he gives the > >>> advantage to the other player, who claims the game win. > >> If they are stalemated, they can say so (and each take half for > >> the tie).http://www.white-wolf.com/vtes/index.php?line=veknRules#sec3.6 > > >> So they remain tied. > > > Hence, my earlier comment to Fred Scott that the VEKN might as well > > ban withdrawal, since time out and agreed-upon stalemate are adequate > > and alternate methods of acknowledging deadlock. > > In deadlock, sure. > > But it is also useful in non-deadlock. > > In 3p, with one Methuselah unable to go forward and yet capable of mounting a > defense against xer predator for a turn, xe can withdraw and let the remaining > two Methuselahs finish normally. Okay, but I would consider that a type of "deadlock", or, in those cases where it is not really a type of "deadlock", a type of "defensive withdrawal." But, semantics aside, I must acknowledge your point, insofar as you have pointed out that there are indeed cases (other than "defensive withdrawal") where withdrawal serves a purpose that cannot be served by time out or agreed-upon stalemate. Where a player has no reasonable prospect of hurting his prey, but is also invulnerable to his current predator, withdrawal removes him from the game, allowing a hopefully more dynamic game to continue among the remaining players. > Also the case in 2p. If one player can mount an offense, but not right now, > while the other is adrift and unable to do anything except wait to be ousted, > the second would prefer to withdraw. That is the sort of situation I had in mind when I used the phrase "defensive withdrawal". > > The only purposes served by withdrawal now are: (1) defensive > > withdrawal; and (2) collusive withdrawal designed to give the other > > player the advantage (possibly including a game win) such as one > > pursuant to a secret coin-toss deal. > > > The most legitimate of these is defensive withdrawals, which are > > possible. But the standard rules sought at least to minimize such > > withdrawals by preventing them in situations where one's opponent > > could demonstrate any power to harm you whatsoever. Though defensive > > withdrawals are permitted where possible, I suspect that Garfields > > general intent was that, if you need to withdraw to avoid being > > ousted, you ought to just get ousted. > > Not at all. > If that were his intent, there would be no withdrawal rule. > > > Defensive withdrawal was, I > > think, merely a side effect of a rule whose intended primary function > > was to acknowledge and score a deadlock. > > No. Anyone can write a much simpler rule to acknowledge and score a > deadlock. I suppose that's true, under a narrow definition of "deadlock". But if we include as a type of "deadlock", or at least as a phenomenon related to "deadlock", the situation of a player who has no reasonable prospect of ever hurting his prey, and no imminent prospect of being hurt by his current predator -- a "stuck" player, if you wish -- then, IMHO, this adequately explains the motivation for the withdrawal rule. I remain of the opinion that the purpose of the withdrawal rule is to allow deadlocked or "stuck" players to bow out (possibly allowing a more dynamic game to continue thereafter), and not to permit doomed players to escape. I recognise that withdrawal *can* be used by doomed players to escape (and that there is nothing wrong with these players taking advantage of the rules in any way they can). It may even be that the latter situation occurs far more often than stuck or deadlocked players. But I still say that this is a side effect of the rule, and not its purpose. Whatever Garfield may have intended, there would (in MY opinion) be no value to the withdrawal rule if its function were only to permit doomed players to escape their doom. The general theme of the game is eat or be eaten.

LSJ

nys...@cs.com wrote: > On Oct 11, 7:57 am, LSJ <vtes...@white-wolf.com> wrote: >> nyst...@cs.com wrote: >>> Hence, my earlier comment to Fred Scott that the VEKN might as well >>> ban withdrawal, since time out and agreed-upon stalemate are adequate >>> and alternate methods of acknowledging deadlock. >> In deadlock, sure. >> >> But it is also useful in non-deadlock. >> >> In 3p, with one Methuselah unable to go forward and yet capable of mounting a >> defense against xer predator for a turn, xe can withdraw and let the remaining >> two Methuselahs finish normally. > > Okay, but I would consider that a type of "deadlock", or, in those > cases where it is not really a type of "deadlock", a type of > "defensive withdrawal." Which is contrary to the idea that "the VEKN might as well ban withdrawal". That point being the one I was addressing.

nys...@cs.com

[ quoted text not captured ] Which is why I wrote (in the very next sentence): "... I must acknowledge your point, insofar as you [ quoted text not captured ]

Frederick Scott

<nys...@cs.com> wrote in message news:1192102828.9...@g4g2000hsf.googlegroups.com... [ quoted text not captured ] Right. "Distortion" boils down to, "isn't like the original game's scoring rules in its effect". It doesn't mean anything bad, per se - unless you equate "isn't like the original game's scoring rules" to something negative. Whenever I attempt to boil out rhetoric out of John's proposals, they seem to come down to making life better for slower developing decks. He decries this conclusion on the basis that it wasn't _his_ conclusion. I realize that. It's mine. Fred

nys...@cs.com

On Oct 18, 3:45 am, "Frederick Scott" <nos...@no.spam.dot.com> wrote: > <nyst...@cs.com> wrote in > > Bram Vink wrote: > >> Still it is unclear. > > >> Please explain, in detail, what the problem is you're trying to > >> fix. Why is this a problem, and what distortion are you talking > >> about? > > > Please see the other thread, particularly my last response to Fred > > Scott, in which I discuss exactly what I mean by distortion ... in > > detail. > > Right. "Distortion" boils down to, "isn't like the original game's > scoring rules in its effect". > It doesn't mean anything bad, per se - > unless you equate "isn't like the original game's scoring rules" to > something negative. You have already said you do not care about my "distortions". I cannot force you to. I am a fan of one game, you are a fan of another. All games are arbitrary, and I have nothing to say to one who prefers a different game. I explained this to you before, but you seem to feel the need to keep going on about it. I have not merely complained that the VEKN rules vary from the standard rules. I have also explained, in considerable detail, why I think it "bad". Those curious about my reasoning can read the relevant posts, and can decide for themselves if they agree with the standards by which I judge "bad". But, once again, you have already made it perfectly crystal clear that you do not agree with any of my "arbitrary" standards, and, of course, I cannot force you to care. You do seem to care about incentivizing risk and promoting fast games. This might provide a basis for us to discuss my current proposal, which is intended to promote fast games. Problem is you seem determined to insinuate that I have a secret agenda of promoting slow games. > Whenever I attempt to boil out rhetoric out of John's proposals, they > seem to come down to making life better for slower developing decks. > He decries this conclusion on the basis that it wasn't _his_ conclusion. > I realize that. It's mine. My purpose in presenting the current proposal is to promote fast, aggressive, risk-taking conduct by players who want to win. Other people in this thread have argued that would not have the effect I intend (and without sneaking in the ad-hominem insinuation that I do not really intend it). I have responded to their objections, and as far as I can tell, successfully refuted them.

Frederick Scott

<nys...@cs.com> wrote in message news:1192720889....@v29g2000prd.googlegroups.com... > On Oct 18, 3:45 am, "Frederick Scott" <nos...@no.spam.dot.com> wrote: >> <nyst...@cs.com> wrote in > > Bram Vink wrote: >> > Please see the other thread, particularly my last response to Fred >> > Scott, in which I discuss exactly what I mean by distortion ... in >> > detail. >> >> Right. "Distortion" boils down to, "isn't like the original game's >> scoring rules in its effect". >> It doesn't mean anything bad, per se - >> unless you equate "isn't like the original game's scoring rules" to >> something negative. > > You have already said you do not care about my "distortions". I > cannot force you to. I am a fan of one game, you are a fan of > another. All games are arbitrary, and I have nothing to say to one > who prefers a different game. I explained this to you before, but you > seem to feel the need to keep going on about it. > > I have not merely complained that the VEKN rules vary from the > standard rules. I have also explained, in considerable detail, why I > think it "bad". Those curious about my reasoning can read the > relevant posts, and can decide for themselves if they agree with the > standards by which I judge "bad". But, once again, you have already > made it perfectly crystal clear that you do not agree with any of my > "arbitrary" standards, and, of course, I cannot force you to care. As I said, as far as I can make out from your text, it all boils down to, "the effect is different from the effect of the original rules". Your definitions of 'distortion' inevitably lead back to one of two things: non-comformance with the concept of victory point conservation or differences with the intent of the incentives provided in the original game rules. You're right to claim that I don't care and you can't force me to care. Further more, I believe most people wouldn't care and I believe your posts are less than frank about pointing out a value system you hold which is rather controversial when understood and thus is some- what misleading. Mind you, this is not equivalent to accusing you of lying as you seem quick to assume. I don't know why you make the assumption that people agree with your system of values; it may be your genuine opinion that they should. None the less, I think any debate about the kinds of things you propose ought to shed light on this point. > You do seem to care about incentivizing risk and promoting fast > games. This might provide a basis for us to discuss my current > proposal, which is intended to promote fast games. Problem is you > seem determined to insinuate that I have a secret agenda of promoting > slow games. Put it this way: the first proposal you floated did seem to have that effect. The second claimed to incentize resolving games but I think that, for whatever reasons, it erred in assuming that incentizing making ousts and incentizing resolving games are the same things. And the second proposal contained the same provision as the first which equated the value of a player gaining two or more ousts and surviving to time with one that gained two or more ousts and acheived last man standing status. Such a provision is certainly not an incentive to resolving games, as far as I can see. You defend such things with your 'distortion' argument; hence my association of the distortion thing with the desire to see slower decks promoted in the system of scoring. Slower decks inevitably lead to slower games, yes. I have not claimed you were attempting to promote slower _games_, per se. Only that slower games would be the outcome, intended or otherwise, of something you do seem to be promoting. And I think there's a lot of frustration with slower games amongst the players at large. > Other people in this thread have argued that would not have the effect > I intend (and without sneaking in the ad-hominem insinuation that I do > not really intend it). No one has "snuck" an ad-hominem arguments in at all. I would suggest that you look at how you twist some of my conclusions into the suggestion of ad-hominem insinuation or outright attacks if they bother you. I refuse to constrain my reasoning about your proposals out of sensitivity to such self-inflicted misunderstandings. Fred

nys...@cs.com

On Oct 18, 12:02 pm, "Frederick Scott" <nos...@no.spam.dot.com> wrote: > <nyst...@cs.com> wrote in message > As I said, as far as I can make out from your text, it all boils down > to, "the effect is different from the effect of the original rules". > Your definitions of 'distortion' inevitably lead back to one of two > things: non-comformance with the concept of victory point conservation > or differences with the intent of the incentives provided in the original > game rules. You're right to claim that I don't care and you can't force > me to care. Since you don't care about my views, I suggest you stop trying to summarize them for me. > Further more, I believe most people wouldn't care and I > believe your posts are less than frank about pointing out a value system > you hold which is rather controversial when understood and thus is some- > what misleading. Mind you, this is not equivalent to accusing you of > lying as you seem quick to assume. I don't know why you make the > assumption that people agree with your system of values; it may be your > genuine opinion that they should. None the less, I think any debate > about the kinds of things you propose ought to shed light on this point. I can make no sense of the above paragraph, except that, you seem to be accusing me of assuming that most people agree with me. I don't know on what basis you make this accusation, since as far as I know, I have spoken only for myself. Meanwhile, ironocally, you explicitly state your belief that most people agree with you. > > You do seem to care about incentivizing risk and promoting fast > > games. This might provide a basis for us to discuss my current > > proposal, which is intended to promote fast games. Problem is you > > seem determined to insinuate that I have a secret agenda of promoting > > slow games. > > Put it this way: the first proposal you floated did seem to have that > effect. The second claimed to incentize resolving games but I think > that, for whatever reasons, it erred in assuming that incentizing > making ousts and incentizing resolving games are the same things. I made no such assumption. I merely incentivized ousting one's own prey as a means of incentivizing faster more aggressive games that are more likely to resolve within the time limit. > And > the second proposal contained the same provision as the first which > equated the value of a player gaining two or more ousts and surviving > to time with one that gained two or more ousts and acheived last man > standing status. Others have raised this objection in this thread, and I have already addressed it at length. You have made no response. > Such a provision is certainly not an incentive to > resolving games, as far as I can see. No it isn't. Neither is it a disincentive. My proposal is an ALTERNATE risk incentivizing VP allocation proposal, which, I argue, is more effective than the current one. > You defend such things with your > 'distortion' argument; hence my association of the distortion thing > with the desire to see slower decks promoted in the system of scoring. Are you accusing me of desiring to promote slower decks with this proposal? Sure sounds that way. Why not just believe me when I say I do not believe the original incentive is effective, and that I care about the resulting distortions? That way you could simply address my proposal on its own terms and stop accusing me of "the desire to see slower decks promoted". > Slower decks inevitably lead to slower games, yes. I have not claimed > you were attempting to promote slower _games_, per se. Only that slower > games would be the outcome, intended or otherwise, of something you do > seem to be promoting. And I think there's a lot of frustration with > slower games amongst the players at large. So far, your only objection to my proposal is that it is not the same proposal, and that I have removed the original incentive to fast games. You have made no meaningful response to my claims that I have removed an ineffective incentive and replaced it with a far more effective one. > > Other people in this thread have argued that would not have the effect > > I intend (and without sneaking in the ad-hominem insinuation that I do > > not really intend it). > > No one has "snuck" an ad-hominem arguments in at all. I would suggest > that you look at how you twist some of my conclusions into the suggestion > of ad-hominem insinuation or outright attacks if they bother you. I > refuse to constrain my reasoning about your proposals out of sensitivity > to such self-inflicted misunderstandings. Oh, I really don't think this is my imagination.

Frederick Scott

<nys...@cs.com> wrote in message news:1192730696.9...@e34g2000pro.googlegroups.com... > On Oct 18, 12:02 pm, "Frederick Scott" <nos...@no.spam.dot.com> wrote: >> <nyst...@cs.com> wrote in message >> As I said, as far as I can make out from your text, it all boils down >> to, "the effect is different from the effect of the original rules". >> Your definitions of 'distortion' inevitably lead back to one of two >> things: non-comformance with the concept of victory point conservation >> or differences with the intent of the incentives provided in the original >> game rules. You're right to claim that I don't care and you can't force >> me to care. > > Since you don't care about my views, I suggest you stop trying to > summarize them for me. I am NOT summarizing them _for_ _you_ - as if you were the only one entitled to characterize the gist of what you wrote. I am summarizing what I got from what you wrote. Other people are likewise entitled to their opinions if they choose to go read it. Otherwise, you seem to be demanding the sole right to paraphrase it - which is unreasonable. You're acting like a movie producer demanding the right to censor an unsympathetic critic. You may not like my summary but tough shit. >> Further more, I believe most people wouldn't care and I >> believe your posts are less than frank about pointing out a value system >> you hold which is rather controversial when understood and thus is some- >> what misleading. Mind you, this is not equivalent to accusing you of >> lying as you seem quick to assume. I don't know why you make the >> assumption that people agree with your system of values; it may be your >> genuine opinion that they should. None the less, I think any debate >> about the kinds of things you propose ought to shed light on this point. > > I can make no sense of the above paragraph, except that, you seem to > be accusing me of assuming that most people agree with me. Yes, you seem to make that assumption. Your whole method of selling your proposals implicitly makes that assumption. > I don't > know on what basis you make this accusation, since as far as I know, I > have spoken only for myself. Logic, obviously. If you conceded that others did _not_ share your system of values, any argument for your proposals would automatically require that you defend the values on which they're based. Since you've never lifted a finger to advocate, the inevitable conclusion is that you already believe others must share them. > Meanwhile, ironocally, you explicitly > state your belief that most people agree with you. Yes. _I_ state it straight out - in the open - where people can see what values I believe they share and choose to agree or disagree as they please, with the implications to the value of my arguments well-understood. IMHO, this is much better than constructing a whole system of reasoning based on principals that others may or may not agree with and just ignoring the issue entirely. >> > You do seem to care about incentivizing risk and promoting fast >> > games. This might provide a basis for us to discuss my current >> > proposal, which is intended to promote fast games. Problem is you >> > seem determined to insinuate that I have a secret agenda of promoting >> > slow games. >> >> Put it this way: the first proposal you floated did seem to have that >> effect. The second claimed to incentize resolving games but I think >> that, for whatever reasons, it erred in assuming that incentizing >> making ousts and incentizing resolving games are the same things. > > I made no such assumption. I merely incentivized ousting one's own > prey as a means of incentivizing faster more aggressive games that are > more likely to resolve within the time limit. I'm not sure where you're not understanding what I just got through saying. Assuming that "(incentizing) ousting one's own prey" would thereby yield "faster more aggressive games more likely to resolve within the time limit" is *EXACTLY* the confusion I'm talking about. I do not agree that the one leads to the other. I'm not sure why you do. >> And >> the second proposal contained the same provision as the first which >> equated the value of a player gaining two or more ousts and surviving >> to time with one that gained two or more ousts and acheived last man >> standing status. > > Others have raised this objection in this thread, and I have already > addressed it at length. You have made no response. I have not seen any new ground in any of your other responses. There's nothing to respond to, in essence. I'd say we're at an impasse here. >> Such a provision is certainly not an incentive to >> resolving games, as far as I can see. > > No it isn't. Neither is it a disincentive. My proposal is an > ALTERNATE risk incentivizing VP allocation proposal, which, I argue, > is more effective than the current one. I was segmenting your second proposal. The part about docking survivors .8 of their first VP was interesting although I'm personally skeptical of its efficacy in resolving games, in the end. The part about _not_ docking those with two or more ousts where they used to get docked .5 VPs on an unresolved game strikes me as unnecessary and integral with the rest of it. And I certainly _do_ see it as a disincentive. I'm not sure how it can judged otherwise. >> You defend such things with your >> 'distortion' argument; hence my association of the distortion thing >> with the desire to see slower decks promoted in the system of scoring. > > Are you accusing me of desiring to promote slower decks with this > proposal? Sure sounds that way. Why not just believe me when I say I > do not believe the original incentive is effective, and that I care > about the resulting distortions? It's not an accusation. It's an observation. I don't have to believe or disbelieve anything. I just look at the effect of what your proposals actually _do_ and go from there. > That way you could simply address > my proposal on its own terms and stop accusing me of "the desire to > see slower decks promoted". You see everything critical as an accusation. That's tough. The solution is for you to stop worrying about what your critics are "accusing" you of and just deal with the merits of their arguments. >> Slower decks inevitably lead to slower games, yes. I have not claimed >> you were attempting to promote slower _games_, per se. Only that slower >> games would be the outcome, intended or otherwise, of something you do >> seem to be promoting. And I think there's a lot of frustration with >> slower games amongst the players at large. > > So far, your only objection to my proposal is that it is not the same > proposal, I don't even know what that means. That does not sound like one of my objections, no. ("Was it ever the same bus?"...Hunter S. Thompson in response to the Smithsonian's accusation that Ken Kesey was attempting to donate a phony bus to them in place of the original "Magic Bus".) > and that I have removed the original incentive to fast > games. You have made no meaningful response to my claims that I have > removed an ineffective incentive and replaced it with a far more > effective one. You removed an incentive and replaced it was a less effective one or none at all. We'll have to disagree on what's meaningful. Fred

nys...@cs.com

On Oct 18, 7:29 pm, "Frederick Scott" <nos...@no.spam.dot.com> wrote: > <nyst...@cs.com> wrote in message > > news:1192730696.9...@e34g2000pro.googlegroups.com... > > > On Oct 18, 12:02 pm, "Frederick Scott" <nos...@no.spam.dot.com> wrote: > >> <nyst...@cs.com> wrote in message > >> As I said, as far as I can make out from your text, it all boils down > >> to, "the effect is different from the effect of the original rules". > >> Your definitions of 'distortion' inevitably lead back to one of two > >> things: non-comformance with the concept of victory point conservation > >> or differences with the intent of the incentives provided in the original > >> game rules. You're right to claim that I don't care and you can't force > >> me to care. > > > Since you don't care about my views, I suggest you stop trying to > > summarize them for me. > > I am NOT summarizing them _for_ _you_ - as if you were the only one entitled > to characterize the gist of what you wrote. I am summarizing what I got > from what you wrote. Other people are likewise entitled to their opinions > if they choose to go read it. Otherwise, you seem to be demanding the > sole right to paraphrase it - which is unreasonable. You're acting like > a movie producer demanding the right to censor an unsympathetic critic. > You may not like my summary but tough shit. Have fun arguing with yourself, then. I don't want to be involved.

nys...@cs.com

LSJ wrote: > Which is contrary to the idea that "the VEKN might as well ban > withdrawal". That point being the one I was addressing. Incorporating your objection into my prior analysis, my analysis could be revised as follows: >From the perspective of the withdrawing player, withdrawal can serve 4 functions: (1) a collusive purpose, intended to give another player an advantage; (2) defensive purpose; (3) acknowledging a 2-player deadlock, thereby ending the game; (4) breaking a multiplayer "deadlock" by permitting the "deadlocked" player to retire, therby permitting a more dynamic game to continue thereafter among the remaining players. (1). Collusive withdrawal: A collusive purpose is generally illegitimate; and in any event, is not something we need a withdrawal rule to promote. (2). Defensive withdrawal. A defensive purpose is legitimate, provided a withdrawal rule exists for other reasons. However, it is not a reason to have a withdrawal rule. The theme of the game is eat or be eaten, and to the extent that withdrawal allows escape from those alternatives, it undermines the theme of the game (as well as making tie games -- as opposed to clear winners -- more likely). The withdrawal rule, therefore, cannot be justified by appealing to its collusive function or its defensive function. That leaves only its last two functions -- variants of the deadlock-ending function. The purpose served by the deadlock-ending function are either to speed up a stalled game (in a multiplayer context) or to bring it to an end (in a two player context). (3). Deadlock (2-player): Deadlock in a 2-player context can be subject to a relatively simple analysis (compared to multiplayer). In a 2-player context, the game always ends upon withdrawal, and one's opponent (under the current VEKN rules) always receives twice the vp award that the withdrawer receives. Also, in a one-on-one dynamic it is usually easier and far less time consuming to determine if a deadlock is truly unbreakable. Hence, in this context, a player will always prefer time out or agreed-upon stalemate to withdrawal -- unless, of course, he wants to grant his enemy a collusive benefit; or unless he fears ousting, in which case it is really a "defensive withdrawal" (see above). Hence, 2 player deadlocks do not provide justification for the withdrawal rule under VEKN rules. It's only legitimate use is defensive withdrawal, which, though legitimate if one has a withdrawal rule, is not a reason to have a withdrawal rule. The situation most subject to the temptation of collusion is the one where each of 2 players has a victory point and each knows that by withdrawing he will grant the other a game win. Obviously, there is a strong temptation in such circumstances to arrange a withdrawal according to a "coin toss" type deal. The closest thing to an exception to the above analysis is the situation where the withdrawing player already has 2 vp, and therefore knows that, by withdrawing, he will secure the game win. Of course, he can also secure a game win by surviving until time out or by agreeing upon a stalemate, so, once again, the only reason to do this is because he fears ousting. Hence, again, this is a kind of a defensive deadlock. The thing that makes it (almost) an exception is that the value of firmly securing of a game win is so great that the prospect of eventual ousting -- no matter how remote or unlikely -- will justify the players interest in withdrawal. (4). Deadlock (Multiplayer). By "multiplayer deadlock" I mean a situation where a predator has no hope of ousting his prey, but is in no foreseeable danger of being ousted by his current predator. This situation differs from 2-player deadlock in that (a) due to the complexity of the situation, uncertainties are increased many-fold -- making it harder to distinguish between a defensive withdrawal and a deadlock-breaking withdrawal, and (b) the extra benefit one grants to one's opponent is not immediately received, and will not be received at all if the game goes to time. Hence, the uncertainties that drive the "exception" cited under 2- player deadlock will be far more common here. The uncertainties mean that there will be many situations where it woll be impossible to fault the decision of a player who, having scored two ousts, decides to secure his victory by a withdrawal. However, the same principles still generally apply. The half-vp discount makes it far less likely that the deadlocked player will think withdrawing is worthwhile. The logical thing to do, if he is truly deadlocked, is to stay in the game, so as to make sure the game goes to time, thereby depriving his unworthy opponents of the "last man standing" benefit he cannot sieze for himself. Unless his fear of being ousted and losing a half-vp is sufficiently great (in which case we are dealing with a withdrawal that is mainly defensive), he will have no interest in promoting a more dynamic game among the remaining players. Why would he want one of them to get that half vp for finishing? Why would he want to increase the chance that one of them will claim a game win? So, if the prospect of being ousted is merely a remote possibility, then the remote fear of losing that half victory point will tend to be more than balanced by the fact that, by withdrawing, he is promoting a more dynamic game, and thereby increasing the chance that one of his fellow players will secure a game win. If his fear of being ousted is not-so remote, then we are dealing with a withdrawal that is primarily defensive. So, the same conclusion still applies, if a little more tentatively due to the inherent uncertainties. Any situation where a player's withdrawal may break a deadlock and promote a dynamic game is precisly a situation where it would probably be wiser for the player to stay in the game; for such situations, by their very nature, give him the opportunity to instead to slow down the game and prevent his enemies from claiming a victory he cannot claim for himself. The clearest exceptions to this rule will be those cases that are actually defensive withdrawals Again, the only players for whom it will be, generally speaking, advisable to withdraw will be those who have already scored 2 ousts. These are the only people claiming for themselves more than they grant their opponents. Apart from that, we are lead, more or less, to the same conclusion. The VEKN might as well ban withdrawal, for the half vp granted under the current rules does not adequately recompense a player in most situations where he might have both the opportunity and the temptation to withdraw, and where the withdrawal is not primarily a defensive attempt to avoid imminent ousting, and where the withdrawal might in fact promote a more dynamic game among the remaining players.