Yet another PTW question

AFAIK, the current rulings about PTW sound like this: * A player must try to achieve GW if he has reasonable chances to get it. * If the player has no reasonable chances to get GW, he must try to get the maximum number of VPs (i.e. 2VPs if he has reasonable chances to get them, or 1VP otherwise). In my playgroup we frequently stumble on the following situation: when some players start to negotiate about a table-splitting deal, the other players quickly determine that WITH THAT DEAL active they won't be able to get any VPs. So, they are trying to get included into that deal, even for 1VP. Such behaviour leads to extremely stupid games where three players quickly kill the remaining two and split the rewards. I wonder, whether such behaviour is legal or not? I mean, if two players are really unable to get GW and trying to split the table, should we count the threat of the NOT-YET-MADE deal as a reason for the third player to give up the GW or 2VP? The 2-2-1 deals really became a menace for us. Thanks in advance, Ector

[ quoted text not captured ] Sounds fine, so long as the NOT-YET-MADE deal was legal in the first place (that is, you have to wait until one of the two instigators is really out of the running for a GW before the process can start). It seems likely that the player who's taking the losing end of the initial deal would have a better outcome by dealing with one of the other players instead, of course. Or the three other players could also make their own deal (excluding the two instigators), instead of rewarding the instigators, as well.

Ector wrote: > In my playgroup we frequently stumble on the following situation: when > some players start to negotiate about a table-splitting deal, the other > players quickly determine that WITH THAT DEAL active they won't be able > to get any VPs. So, they are trying to get included into that deal, > even for 1VP. Here is my question about this. Why are people making such deals in what is presumably casual play (i.e. non tournament play, where no one is playing for money and no one is keeping track of VPs for any purpose other than bragging rights. And maybe a beer.) Like, I am generally fundamentally opposed to table splitting deals in any situation in VTES, competition or no. But at least in a competetive play situation, where you are playing for money (money being code for "prizes of some type") and game wins/VPs are being kept track of for purposes of winning money and or getting rating points (assuming you care about such things), I can understand why people broker and accept such deals. Personally, I rarely have anything to do with such deals, and generally actively try and undermine such deals when other people make them (although I have been known to, in the end game when there is only me and another guy, bargain to mutually withdraw rather than fight it out to the bitter end). But at least I understand where they come from. Now I may be misunderstanding you, and this question may come from the context of a tournament. But if not, why are people making such deals? Isn't it best for everyone, in such play situations, to simply play the game, see if you win or lose, and if you win, great, if you lose, ok, and in either case, just play another game? Like, this is in no way a criticism, but I'm trying to understand other people's play groups, I guess--like my local play group, when playing "casually" (i.e. we are having a general play night of VTES with nothing on the line), no one ever makes any deals at all other than the general quid pro quo kinda "hey, rescue my guy from torpor and I'll help you pass your next vote" deal. Likely, no one would ever consider brokering a table split deal. -Peter

pd...@lightlink.com wrote: > Like, this is in no way a criticism, but I'm trying to understand other > people's play groups, I guess--like my local play group, when playing > "casually" (i.e. we are having a general play night of VTES with > nothing on the line), no one ever makes any deals at all other than the > general quid pro quo kinda "hey, rescue my guy from torpor and I'll > help you pass your next vote" deal. Likely, no one would ever consider > brokering a table split deal. That would be the same in our play group as well (London for the record), we pretty much just do a few little deals like the one you mentioned but no table deals. Occasionally we see a deal of some kind in a three player game, to see if two players can take out one strong player or something like that just to keep the game interesting for everyone but that would be about it. Not much fun to be ousted in 20 minutes and then watch the other two players fight it out for an hour after all :-)

On Fri, 26 May 2006, LSJ wrote: > Or the three other players could also make their own deal (excluding > the two instigators), instead of rewarding the instigators, as well. This works. It's a great way to break up a table split deal. In fact, if the three non-instigating players are on the ball and can do simple math (3 vs. 2), early table split deals should never work. Ector, if you like I can furnish you with an anecdote or two, but you can probably imagine how it works. Next time you see one of these table splits, suggest to the other players they form an alliance to break up the split. The original instigators will quickly backpedal and the deal will often become so confused that people just go back to plan A: bleed prey. By the way, a deal that results in 2:2:1 can only be legal if all three of those players have no chance of a game win. How often can that really happen? Matt Morgan

Ector wrote: > AFAIK, the current rulings about PTW sound like this: > * A player must try to achieve GW if he has reasonable chances to get > it. > * If the player has no reasonable chances to get GW, he must try to get > the maximum number of VPs (i.e. 2VPs if he has reasonable chances to > get them, or 1VP otherwise). Hello everyone! I'm from the same playgroup as Ector's. I want to ask LSJ about the detail explanation and interpretation of the rules quoted above, because we faced with some situations when it took place a table-splitting in the FINAL play of the tournament. There are some players that understand this rule exactly as it is and don't make any exceptions for the final game (and what is important, the judge shares this opinion). So when somebody concludes that Game Win is unreachable for him he initiate the table-splitting in order to receive at least one or two Victory Points (I'll be damned if I know what for! In final, VP without GW is useless). He motivates those deal with the mentioned rules - "I can't reach GW so I'll maximize my VP". Judge accept this deal. Of course, the others have no choice but to make another table-splitting deal and game quickly collapse into confrontation of two quasi-commands...or, if the first player made 2-2-1 deal with two players, another two players quickly lose the game. Please, explain to me, is it normal? Do everyone should seek for the table-splitting (and destabilize the game) if the chance of receiving GW is minor? Is it legal for him to give away that minor chance and try to receive at least a couple of VPs even in final game?

Matthew T. Morgan wrote: > On Fri, 26 May 2006, LSJ wrote: > > Ector, if you like I can furnish you with an anecdote or two, but you can > probably imagine how it works. Next time you see one of these table > splits, suggest to the other players they form an alliance to break up the > split. > > Matt Morgan You know, the ramarkable detail is that Ector is one of those who usually proposes such a table-splitting deals "in order to maximize VPs". ;)))

Allionarr wrote: > I want to ask LSJ about the detail explanation and interpretation of > the rules quoted above, because we faced with some situations when it > took place a table-splitting in the FINAL play of the tournament. There > are some players that understand this rule exactly as it is and don't > make any exceptions for the final game (and what is important, the > judge shares this opinion). So when somebody concludes that Game Win is > unreachable for him he initiate the table-splitting in order to receive > at least one or two Victory Points (I'll be damned if I know what for! > In final, VP without GW is useless). He motivates those deal with the This is key -- in a "final", players are more inherently playing to win, since not doing so is pointless. > mentioned rules - "I can't reach GW so I'll maximize my VP". Judge > accept this deal. Of course, the others have no choice but to make > another table-splitting deal and game quickly collapse into > confrontation of two quasi-commands...or, if the first player made > 2-2-1 deal with two players, another two players quickly lose the game. ... with the understanding that one of the 2VP players is actually playing for the game win, since the tie in a final round will be broken rather than allowed to stand as a tie. > Please, explain to me, is it normal? Do everyone should seek for the > table-splitting (and destabilize the game) if the chance of receiving > GW is minor? Is it legal for him to give away that minor chance and try > to receive at least a couple of VPs even in final game? It is not normal in a final if "minor" is merely "small, but reasonable". Of course, once a finalist cannot reasonably expect that achieving a GW is possible, he may find it advantageous to make a deal to improve his expected final standing (coming in third is better than coming in fifth).

LSJ wrote: > Of course, once a finalist cannot reasonably expect that achieving a GW > is possible, he may find it advantageous to make a deal to improve his > expected final standing (coming in third is better than coming in > fifth). But when he makes a deal with somebody, he gives those player an advantage relatively to other players. If they won't make another table-splitting - everyone of them would be in disadvantage. If they'll make a deal - two of them lose their chance to receive GW. So isn't this destabilization too much price for possibility of one player to recieve a couple of VPs?

On Fri, 26 May 2006, Matthew T. Morgan wrote: > On Fri, 26 May 2006, LSJ wrote: > >> Or the three other players could also make their own deal (excluding >> the two instigators), instead of rewarding the instigators, as well. > > This works. It's a great way to break up a table split deal. In fact, if > the three non-instigating players are on the ball and can do simple math (3 > vs. 2), early table split deals should never work. > I'm not really sure that it would. Most of the table split deals I've seen look a lot like this: The player who's probably going to come in second forges a table split deal with the player who's probably going to come in first, trying to trick him into changing positions. In this case, the remaining players already have a de facto deal, since they're all going to be ousted anyway. -- - Gregory Stuart Pettigrew

pd...@lightlink.com wrote: > Here is my question about this. Why are people making such deals in > what is presumably casual play (i.e. non tournament play, where no one > is playing for money and no one is keeping track of VPs for any purpose > other than bragging rights. And maybe a beer.) Simple reason. We (in Franfurt, Germany) play every game like a tournament game to train ourselves for tournament play and because we think it is more fun. And you dont have to decide special cases because "it is all fun" like taking forgotten pool for the edge or playing an illegal deck. We play by the (tournament) rules, period (including time limit). But still we have three exceptions in casual play: - We allow proxies. To really have decks like they could be in tournaments. - In three player games we usually dont deal (at the beginning), because that gets stupid. - In six player games we play "X=number of methuselah" is maximum 5 and use a time limit of 2,5h. Frank

@ all Dont forget: Breaking deals kills bad deals and is therefore good for the game.

On Fri, 26 May 2006, Gregory Stuart Pettigrew wrote: > On Fri, 26 May 2006, Matthew T. Morgan wrote: > >> On Fri, 26 May 2006, LSJ wrote: >> >>> Or the three other players could also make their own deal (excluding >>> the two instigators), instead of rewarding the instigators, as well. >> >> This works. It's a great way to break up a table split deal. In fact, if >> the three non-instigating players are on the ball and can do simple math (3 >> vs. 2), early table split deals should never work. >> > > I'm not really sure that it would. Most of the table split deals I've seen > look a lot like this: Not really sure what would? > The player who's probably going to come in second forges a table split deal > with the player who's probably going to come in first, trying to trick him > into changing positions. In this case, the remaining players already have a > de facto deal, since they're all going to be ousted anyway. I don't understand what you're saying. A de facto deal is meaningless unless the players are actually cooperating, like rescuing one another from torpor, voting for each others referenda, etc. If the three players not involved in the deal just continue to play their games and wind up ousted by the instigators, then the de facto deal isn't worth crud. Matt Morgan

x5m...@gmx.de wrote: > Simple reason. We (in Franfurt, Germany) play every game like a > tournament game to train ourselves for tournament play and because we > think it is more fun. And you dont have to decide special cases because > "it is all fun" like taking forgotten pool for the edge or playing an > illegal deck. We play by the (tournament) rules, period (including time > limit). Sure. But it isn't like you can benefit from practicing making table split deals. Like, it is certainly a good plan to play with strict rules and all to get in the habit and whatever, but making table split deals isn't something that benefits from practice. And is likely to irriate friends. -Peter

[ quoted text not captured ] That totally depends on the expectations of those friends. The DC group is pretty cuthroat most of the time (except when newbies or out-of-practice oldbies show up), so while we may whine about it some, we generally don't mind anyone dealing dirty to get the GW. Tablesplit deals are sometimes done and most of the time the purpose of them is simply to bring the game to the expected conclusion a little faster so we can get another game in. We allow proxies and play a little fast and loose with the rules (last night I exercised the Cheating Phase to save myself from a Bakija Gambit buying a second Anastaz di Zagreb for 10 pool when I should've been getting Lucas) in casual play, but the understanding is we're training for tournaments (with terrible decks most of the time, but still). So unless someone is like "okay, I realize this deck is terrible, but just let me pull off this combo before you oust me with your well-tuned tournament-winning deck" then there isn't a lot of room for nice guys at our tables. If dealing is the path to GW or maximized VPs, then that's what is expected. Matt Morgan

LSJ wrote: > This is key -- in a "final", players are more inherently playing to > win, since not doing so is pointless. You forgot "in theory". In reality, the situation is quite different. Don't make me break out the sig! -- David Cherryholmes

Matthew T. Morgan wrote: > That totally depends on the expectations of those friends. The DC group > is pretty cuthroat most of the time (except when newbies or > out-of-practice oldbies show up), so while we may whine about it some, we > generally don't mind anyone dealing dirty to get the GW. Tablesplit deals > are sometimes done and most of the time the purpose of them is simply to > bring the game to the expected conclusion a little faster so we can get > another game in. Heh. Yeah, in situations like that, we'll generally end the game by consensus ("Yaa! Let's declare Ben the winner! As otherwise this stalemate will go on for ever!"). But I can see that. > We allow proxies and play a little fast and loose with the rules (last > night I exercised the Cheating Phase to save myself from a Bakija Gambit > buying a second Anastaz di Zagreb for 10 pool when I should've been > getting Lucas) in casual play, but the understanding is we're training for > tournaments (with terrible decks most of the time, but still). So unless > someone is like "okay, I realize this deck is terrible, but just let me > pull off this combo before you oust me with your well-tuned > tournament-winning deck" then there isn't a lot of room for nice guys at > our tables. If dealing is the path to GW or maximized VPs, then that's > what is expected. Huh. I guess as I'm generally unwilling to make deals like this in competition (and still do pretty well, overall), I'm less likely to do it in casual play. And seems kinda wacky. But yeah, ok. -Peter

Peter Bakija (BAH-kee-ah) wrote: > Like, I am generally fundamentally opposed to table splitting deals in > any situation in VTES, competition or no. It's a pretty sound policy, really. One is very typically best off with, as you mentioned, the smaller stuff like rescues and a little vote help. I like to do VP for VP deals, too. Limited stuff. - Ben Peal

p...@lightlink.com wrote: > Sure. But it isn't like you can benefit from practicing making table > split deals. Like, it is certainly a good plan to play with strict > rules and all to get in the habit and whatever, but making table split > deals isn't something that benefits from practice. And is likely to > irriate friends. Peter, it looks like you think dealing is absolutely random and has no connection with the game. But that is wrong; good VP splitting deals depend absolutely on an analysis of the game state. So you also have to train them and see what happens. You have to train what is a rationale deal and how you can get him through psychological. And you can also train how to make a counter-deal against other players dealing. We sometimes play 4 or 5 player tables with only two players. Every player plays more than one deck in that situation. And even in that games we deal. That goes like: "The Brujah deck would offer a 3-1 deal to his Ventrue predator. " "No, he would not like that the Brujahs get the GW. So he would only accept a 2-2 deal." "But then the Nosferatu would offer the Ventrue a 2-3 deal before he get killed by the Brujah." You are right that it can sometimes irritate newbies. But they usually learn fast. And should they learn dealing for the first time at a tournament?

Matthew T. Morgan wrote: > If dealing is the path to GW or maximized VPs, then that's what is expected. Heh. Thinking about it more, I realized where some of my not understanding table split deals in non tournament play comes from--incentive, or lack therof. Like, in competetive play, there is incentive to maximize VPs, even if you lose the game, as snaring an extra VP or some tournament points or whatever by virtue of taking the losing end of a table split deal can be significant. Everyone has incentive to deal, even for a losing deal. In non tournament (i.e. casual) play, there is no incentive to accept the losing end of the deal, really (other than, ya know, making the game end, but you could just as easily make the game end by going down fighting). In a tournament, you can look at your position and say "I figure I have a less than 20% chance of winning from here. I might as well make a deal that pays off, even if I don't win.", and then make a deal for a few VPs and help someone else win. In casual play, as it doesn't matter if you lose or win in either direction, you have much less incentive to make that deal and much more of a reason to try for the unlikely victory--yeah, you might have an 80% chance of losing, but if you win, it'd be cool, so you might as well try, as you have, ya know, nothing to lose by trying for the risky/unlikely win. -Peter

x5m...@gmx.de wrote: > Peter, it looks like you think dealing is absolutely random and has no > connection with the game. But that is wrong; good VP splitting deals > depend absolutely on an analysis of the game state. Nah. I don't think it is random. I just think that unless there is actual incentive to be on the losing end of the deal (i.e. getting the VP you wouldn't have otherwise, which makes a difference in tournament play but not so much in casual play), there is no reason to accept it. And if there is no reason to accept the losing end of the deal, there can't be a table split deal. To make a table split deal, one guy has to convince someone else at the table to help him win. In competetive play, the tangible payoff of being the stooge in that deal is not insignificant (getting 2VPs instead of 0VPs can be very important in a 3R tournament, say). Without the long term consequence in casual play, there is no incentive to help someone else win, as you are better off trying for the risky and unlikely win rather than dealing to be the stooge, as the incentive to pull off an unlikely but exciting game win (or whatever) seems like a much more tangible incenitve than making a losing deal with no actual incentive. > So you also have to > train them and see what happens. You have to train what is a rationale > deal and how you can get him through psychological. And you can also > train how to make a counter-deal against other players dealing. But you are training in a false environment--with no money on the line, no actual tournament win to be had, the deal making is irrational. In a tournament, there are stakes that make dealing make sense. In casual play, even if you are pretending there are stakes, they aren't there. Like when you are playing poker for no actual money, there is no incentive to not make risky low percentage win bets or gambles, as you got nothing to actually lose. > You are right that it can sometimes irritate newbies. But they usually > learn fast. And should they learn dealing for the first time at a > tournament? I think a lot of this has to do with the overall validity of dealing vs not dealling. As I have mentioned before, I don't tend to make table split deals in competition, and tend to discourage/sabotage them as often as possible in competition, as I find excessive dealmaking to be irksome (it slows the game down and turns it far more into kingmaker than I am fond of), to the point that I'm generally willing to lose rather than help someone else win. But that is me. Like, I don't think newbies need to learn dealing at all, as they can do just fine without dealmaking. That being said, again, I can see how deals like this work in competetive play, but without the incentive built in, I find it weird that it takes place in casual play. -Peter

pd...@lightlink.com wrote: > To make a table split deal, one guy has to convince someone else at the > table to help him win. ... NO. Convincing can be part of dealing like bluffing can be part of combat or bleeding. But dealing with good players is analysing the game state and defining, what is the best part for every player. Example (a real one): Four player table. A is the strongest. B is about to die. C (!Malkavian ie. crosstable power) is about to die, the question is, will he die by A or B. D (thats me) plays wall, so has problems to oust A but can wall up and defend very well. D offers B and C a 2-1-1 deal. The deal is absolutely rationale: B and C will not be able to get 1 VP without a deal. A offers in that situation a deal to C 3-1. C has to decide was is the best deal for him. Both deals give him 1 VP, so he thinks the deal of A is better, because A is the strongest player. B dies. D is able to wall up and the game goes in the time out. So A1,5, B 0, C 0,5, D 0,5 VPs. It looks like C made the false decision, but that was his analysis not that he was convinced. > But you are training in a false environment--with no money on the line, > no actual tournament win to be had, the deal making is irrational. In a > tournament, there are stakes that make dealing make sense. In casual > play, even if you are pretending there are stakes, they aren't there. Is it irrational to play for ousting your prey and getting VPs in casual games? You could instead attack the player who won the last risk game, play to be a absolutely weird Malkavian or throw your cards in the air when you start losing. Playing is about accepting rules that are set by a different world (the game world) and ignoring the rules of the real world. If i can accept the rule to oust my prey, i can also accept to play to absolutely win, i.e. make the most GWs and if that is not possible the most VPs, even by dealing. BTW, its nice to dicuss game philosophy with you, because you have such a different view. Frank

LSJ wrote: > > mentioned rules - "I can't reach GW so I'll maximize my VP". Judge > > accept this deal. Of course, the others have no choice but to make > > another table-splitting deal and game quickly collapse into > > confrontation of two quasi-commands...or, if the first player made > > 2-2-1 deal with two players, another two players quickly lose the game. > > ... with the understanding that one of the 2VP players is actually > playing for the game win, since the tie in a final round will be broken > rather than allowed to stand as a tie. > Please clarify this statement: does it mean that a 2-2 deal in a final round will ALWAYS be legal for the player with the best standings before the final, since it wound be the same as GW for him? Yours, Ector

In message <1148763602....@j33g2000cwa.googlegroups.com>, Ector <Ec...@mail.ru> writes: >Please clarify this statement: does it mean that a 2-2 deal in a final >round will ALWAYS be legal for the player with the best standings >before the final, since it wound be the same as GW for him? What's to clarify? The tournament rules are pretty explicit. The player with the highest total of Victory Points from the final round only is the tournament winner. The player with the next highest total of Victory Points from the final round only is the second place winner, and so on. In the event of a tie, the players' rankings at the end of the preliminary rounds will be the deciding tiebreaker. That is, unlike normal rounds, a tiebreaker is applied, so someone should always win. Since they win, a deal which causes them to win is play-to-win. Theoretically, in a large enough tournament, you could have two players who were tied on GWs, VPs and TPs. i.e. they were tied when going into the final. You may well have already had to resolve that tie for the purposes of who sits where. (In a situation where these are players #4 and #5, you may not have cared since it doesn't make a scrap of difference.) It may then be distasteful to have a situation where an already known arbitrary coin-toss split the two players for positioning in the final, and will continue to split them if they tie in the final, but this is a sufficiently remote possibility that I doubt it's ever come up. -- James Coupe PGP Key: 0x5D623D5D YOU ARE IN ERROR. EBD690ECD7A1FB457CA2 NO-ONE IS SCREAMING. 13D7E668C3695D623D5D THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION.

x5m...@gmx.de wrote: > NO. Convincing can be part of dealing like bluffing can be part of > combat or bleeding. But dealing with good players is analysing the game > state and defining, what is the best part for every player. Sure, but, like, in tournament play, there is alot more to work with to make deals--as I mentioned elsewhere, I'm not generally one to make table split deals in a tournament, let alone in casual play, but at least I can see why someone would make such a deal in a tournament (to get more VPs than they think they would otherwise, which has a significant tangible benefit). In casual play, yeah, you could try to make those deals, but there is so much less incentive to make them for most folks. Like, I don't like seeing table split deals in tournament games (i.e. after a few turns, one player convinces another to help him with with 3VPs in exchange for the other 2VPs), and don't help people make them. But in a casual game, even with the "lets play it like a tournament" mindset, I'd figure that people would be even less likely to take the losing end of the deal (again, lack of incentive). And the other three players would be *much* more likely to play into a losing position simply to spite one of the other two which could very well result in the table split failing anyway. In tournament play, if I were in a game where 2 people formulated a table split, I'd try and convince the other two players to help me foil them, but still, me and the other two players would be much more concerned about trying to get a VP--I'd be much less likely to give up a VP in the name of spiting the "table split" pair. On the other hand, in casual play, if I were in the same situation (players A and B organize a table split, I'm not one of those players), I'd be far more likely to not care about the VP I'm losing in the name of making someone else (i.e. one of player A or B if not both) lose. > Is it irrational to play for ousting your prey and getting VPs in > casual games? No, as that is the assumed goal of the game. > You could instead attack the player who won the last risk > game, play to be a absolutely weird Malkavian or throw your cards in > the air when you start losing. It is assumed that when we all sit down to play VTES, we are all playing by the same rules and with the same goal--to try and win by virtue of the established victory conditions of the game. Otherwise, there is not reallly any point in playing (well, for me at least) that particular game. > Playing is about accepting rules that > are set by a different world (the game world) and ignoring the rules of > the real world. If i can accept the rule to oust my prey, i can also > accept to play to absolutely win, i.e. make the most GWs and if that is > not possible the most VPs, even by dealing. Sure. But again, at a certain point, tangible incentives become an issue. Making a deal to maximize VPs in tournament play has a tangible incentive (i.e. getting you closer to getting in the finals); making a deal to do the same thing in casual play lacks the same built in incentive, and is much more likely to incur the wrath of the other people at the table, resulting in whatever deal is struck failing or falling apart, where in tournament play, they would not fail. Again, look at poker--if I'm playing for actual money, I'll fold like crazy with a bad opening hand; I play very conservatively when I play for actual money. If I'm playing for nothing (chips/pennies), I'll play a much riskier game--I'll go all in just as a bluff, or I'll be much more likely to play a bad opening hand. In either case, the goal of the game is the same: maximize income/win the most money, but the context of the game (real stakes/imaginary stakes) has a significant impact on how the game is handled. > BTW, its nice to dicuss game philosophy with you, because you have such > a different view. You as well. -Peter

Ben Peal wrote: > Peter Bakija (BAH-kee-ah) wrote: Heh. At some point in the past 10 years, I discovered my last name was actually pronounced buh-KEE-ya. So my sister and my brother tend to have differently pronounced last names than me (as per above). And some people I know call me one thing, and all my students call me another thing. Which is kooky :-) > It's a pretty sound policy, really. One is very typically best off > with, > as you mentioned, the smaller stuff like rescues and a little vote > help. I like to do VP for VP deals, too. Limited stuff. Yeah, I totally am with you, just to support the concept further. Helping someone get a VP if they help you get a VP? Sure. Making little quid-pro-quo deals? All the time. But accepting the losing end of an unbalanced deal (or convincing someone else to do the same)? Not so much going to happen. -Peter

pd...@lightlink.com wrote: Like, I don't like seeing table split deals in tournament > games (i.e. after a few turns, one player convinces another to help him > with with 3VPs in exchange for the other 2VPs), and don't help people > make them. It looks like you have to often seen lousy deals. Maybe they are not oiften enough trained? ;-) Usually the necessarity to get a GW and the fear of the breaking of a deal should hinder to early or unnecessary deals. > Sure. But again, at a certain point, tangible incentives become an > issue. Making a deal to maximize VPs in tournament play has a tangible > incentive (i.e. getting you closer to getting in the finals); making a > deal to do the same thing in casual play lacks the same built in > incentive, and is much more likely to incur the wrath of the other > people at the table, resulting in whatever deal is struck failing or > falling apart, where in tournament play, they would not fail. Ok., in casual play you will sometimes make risky actions because there is no incentive. That can be playing more aggressive than usual or that can be not accepting a deal (or accepting the more risky deal because he is more fun). But that doesnt hinder the opportunity to play a game like it is in a tournament. Because i have no bad emotions about deals i am not seduced to play against deals in casual game. > Again, look at poker--if I'm playing for actual money, I'll fold like > crazy with a bad opening hand; I play very conservatively when I play > for actual money. If I'm playing for nothing (chips/pennies), I'll play > a much riskier game-- Nice example. I played Poker yesterday. And we made some warm-up games without actual money. And yes, you are right, it is different. But no, i can behave like we would play for money by rationalizing what i would do, if it would be real money. And in the end playing VTES with or without deals tries to win the game.

x5m...@gmx.de wrote: > It looks like you have to often seen lousy deals. Maybe they are not > oiften enough trained? ;-) Usually the necessarity to get a GW and the > fear of the breaking of a deal should hinder to early or unnecessary > deals. Ya'd think. But still, every once and a while, someone comes up with an early table split deal, that requires someone to accept the bad end of the deal. Which strikes me as bad for the game. So I discourage them (through action, mostly) But at least in competetive play, I see where they come from. > Ok., in casual play you will sometimes make risky actions because there > is no incentive. That can be playing more aggressive than usual or that > can be not accepting a deal (or accepting the more risky deal because > he is more fun). But that doesnt hinder the opportunity to play a game > like it is in a tournament. Because i have no bad emotions about deals > i am not seduced to play against deals in casual game. Sure. But even still, it seems as if someone in the game will be like "huh. I'm not playing for money. I'll do something I wouldn't do if money were on the line in the name of hosing the folks who are making the deal to make me lose" or whatever. If not multiple people. Building an artificial environment. > Nice example. I played Poker yesterday. And we made some warm-up games > without actual money. And yes, you are right, it is different. But no, > i can behave like we would play for money by rationalizing what i would > do, if it would be real money. And in the end playing VTES with or > without deals tries to win the game. True. But without the real money, even if you are trying to pretend it is real money, people will still behave differently, due to the difference in incentives. Which is why I'd figure that some sort of table split deal in a casual game of VTES would result in a lot more wackiness (i.e. the other three people at the table rising and revolting and making someone random win as opposed to the deal making two, as they have nothing to lose). But ok. -Peter

On Sat, 27 May 2006, pd...@lightlink.com wrote: > In casual play, yeah, you could try to > make those deals, but there is so much less incentive to make them for > most folks. There's also a further disincentive. How many times have I seen Ben Peal go from a one-pool hopeless position to win the table? How many times have I seen other people do other feats? By table-dealing too much, you restrict the growth of your own abilities. Since there's no tangible benefit of dealing during casual play, I'd leave it off until the tournament because fighting it out always has a tangible benefit. [ quoted text not captured ]

pd...@lightlink.com wrote: > x5m...@gmx.de wrote: > To make a table split deal, one guy has to convince someone else at the > table to help him win. In competetive play, the tangible payoff of > being the stooge in that deal is not insignificant (getting 2VPs > instead of 0VPs can be very important in a 3R tournament, say). Without > the long term consequence in casual play, there is no incentive to help > someone else win I never before played in an environment where splitting a table made sense, but I have been playing a lot more recently (in Los Angeles). I'd been gaming all day, gradually losing faculty, when I hit upon what seemed to me to be a brilliant suggestion. I looked at a 5 person table and then told the table as a whole, I think I'm willing to make a 3,2 split with anyone. There was a pause and then someone promptly accepted. The thing was, we never worked out which of us was getting the 3, and which the 2. Things didn't exactly go as planned, but this seemed to avoid one person having to agree to give up a gamewin. We just agreed to help each other wipe the other players out first. I'm tempted to try variations on this deal again. -Matt Kanninen

MathiasTCK wrote: > I never before played in an environment where splitting a table made > sense, but I have been playing a lot more recently (in Los Angeles). > I'd been gaming all day, gradually losing faculty, when I hit upon what > seemed to me to be a brilliant suggestion. I looked at a 5 person > table and then told the table as a whole, I think I'm willing to make a > 3,2 split with anyone. There was a pause and then someone promptly > accepted. The thing was, we never worked out which of us was getting > the 3, and which the 2. Things didn't exactly go as planned, but this > seemed to avoid one person having to agree to give up a gamewin. We > just agreed to help each other wipe the other players out first. I'm > tempted to try variations on this deal again. I suspect that that is breaking the "play to win" rule in spirit, if not law. But probably by virtue of law as well. Someone is agreeing, for no particular reason, to agree to lose the game with no particular evidence pointing to the fact that they are probably going to lose anyway. Like, a pair of people saying "We'll split the table 3/2!" does avoid one person having to agree to give up the game win. Or, it has both people agree to give up the game win. -Peter

[ quoted text not captured ] Seems pretty weird to me, but it doesn't violate PtW if both parties think they're on the 3 side. It's fine until someone goes "oh, you mean you get the game win? All right, I transfer out." Now that would be illegal. It's not so different from "Peter, I'm going to help you sweep this table - I just don't care about VPs today" and then ousting you when you tap out. That is also legal, and I think it would work! Matt Morgan

Matthew T. Morgan wrote: > Seems pretty weird to me, but it doesn't violate PtW if both parties think > they're on the 3 side. It's fine until someone goes "oh, you mean you get > the game win? All right, I transfer out." Now that would be illegal. But the inevitable result of "Let's play for a 3/2 split of ambiguity!" is someone is deciding to throw the game with no clear legal reason to do so. I mean, yeah, it is likely a difficult thing to rule one way or the other (and I'm very dubious about having to rule on PTW in the first place, which is why I think it is best if no one ever makes deals like this for everyone's sanity :-), but it seems like the very concept is flawed. > It's not so different from "Peter, I'm going to help you sweep this table > - I just don't care about VPs today" and then ousting you when you tap > out. That is also legal, and I think it would work! But isn't, like, making that "deal" in the first place illegal? Like, you couldn't even legally suggest such a deal, as far as I understand (and consequently, I couldn't agree to such a deal). I mean, yeah, you ousting me when I tap out makes you not playing to not win, but the suggestion is illegal as living up to the deal is illegal. Maybe. I dunno. This is why I don't get involved in table split deals. I don't even understand what makes them legal or not... -Peter

In message <1148918978.0...@j55g2000cwa.googlegroups.com>, pd...@lightlink.com writes: >But the inevitable result of "Let's play for a 3/2 split of ambiguity!" >is someone is deciding to throw the game with no clear legal reason to >do so. Well, there are a few issues here. 1a) If the two of us sit next to each other on a five player table, then it can be indeterminate as to who is getting the win. 1b) If the two of us are cross-table, saying "Let's split it 3-2" does actually give you an answer, assuming that the intention is to keep the outcome as 3-2. Let's take the table A-B-C-D-E. A and D offer a 3-2 deal, but don't specify who gets the win. Okay then. A gets 2 by ousting B and C, but can't get 3 unless he ousts D - at which point D either has 1 VP (from E) or 0 VP. So assuming that 3-2 will be held, A has just agreed to get 2 and D has agreed to get 3. 2) More generally, it's possible to say to the table in general "Okay, let's oust the others and then we'll fight it out for the table win." Which is a perfectly common deal. (Only really works with a cross-table ally, due to similar restrictions as in 1b.) It can then be perfectly reasonable for both players to think they're playing to win, because they both have a deck they think will oust the other e.g. a weenie deck which thinks it can swarm through the opponent, versus a deck that's planning to get Justine out, or an Atonement etc., or some other versatile anti- weenie tech. [ quoted text not captured ]

pd...@lightlink.com wrote: > Matthew T. Morgan wrote: > But the inevitable result of "Let's play for a 3/2 split of ambiguity!" > is someone is deciding to throw the game with no clear legal reason to > do so. The way I see it going down, both players act under the assumption they are the 3, while presenting it possible they are working for the 2. Then when they get to a point where they can't pretend to be the 2, they take the 3, or reopen negotiations. Perhaps a 3rd player is still alive at this point, but merely extremely weakened. So anyway, no won ever throws the game. Perhaps the 2 who team up do end up having to settle the split by one of them bleeding the last remaining player, while the other rushes trying to prevent the other player from claiming the last vp in question. That wouldn't even necessarily be betraying the deal, as long as one of the players ends up with 3, and the other with 2, the initial deal has been satisfied. If I feel I am playing the 2nd strongest deck at the table, I will propose to work with 1st strongest. They will likely assume I will settle for vp's instead of the gamewin. I trade things I need, (protection from ugly votes) for things I can freely give (whatever that is for a given deck, a rush or two perhaps). This works best for decks that can help other players very easily, at little cost to themselves. I've been enjoying using Renewed Vigor to bargain for the assistance of another player :) -Matt Kanninen

James Coupe wrote: > 1b) If the two of us are cross-table, saying "Let's split it 3-2" does > actually give you an answer, assuming that the intention is to > keep the outcome as 3-2. Let's take the table A-B-C-D-E. A and > D offer a 3-2 deal, but don't specify who gets the win. Okay > then. A gets 2 by ousting B and C, but can't get 3 unless he > ousts D - at which point D either has 1 VP (from E) or 0 VP. So > assuming that 3-2 will be held, A has just agreed to get 2 and D > has agreed to get 3. Can't D get 1 vp from E, and then withdraw? You seem to only be considering ousting as a possible way of acquiring vp. The situations get's even further if we count half a point for surviving right? I'm still a little bit hazy about all the ramifications of VPs. I didn't realize how the final table worked at a tournament, for example, until too late :) -Matt Kanninen

In message <1149024947....@y43g2000cwc.googlegroups.com>, MathiasTCK <mathi...@gmail.com> writes: >James Coupe wrote: >> 1b) If the two of us are cross-table, saying "Let's split it 3-2" does >> actually give you an answer, assuming that the intention is to >> keep the outcome as 3-2. Let's take the table A-B-C-D-E. A and >> D offer a 3-2 deal, but don't specify who gets the win. Okay >> then. A gets 2 by ousting B and C, but can't get 3 unless he >> ousts D - at which point D either has 1 VP (from E) or 0 VP. So >> assuming that 3-2 will be held, A has just agreed to get 2 and D >> has agreed to get 3. > >Can't D get 1 vp from E, and then withdraw? You seem to only be >considering ousting as a possible way of acquiring vp. He could, giving A the 3. However, for that to happen in almost any practical circumstance, A would have to let it happen and it would have to be arranged, because D would need to do things like empty her library and not get bled out. The level of co-operation required[0] is really pretty different from the situation of just throwing "Let's get a 3 and 2 split going here, but we'll not decide who gets on the winning end of the deal right now because we both think it'll be us." It's exactly the sort of thing that would happen under an *organised* table-split, where you say "I'll get 3 and you get 2 and we'll do it like this." But that wasn't the point of this sort of deal, as I understand it. [0] Again, in most practical circumstances. Yes, withdrawals do happen under fire, but it's very, very rare. [ quoted text not captured ]

James Coupe wrote: > In message <1149024947....@y43g2000cwc.googlegroups.com>, > The level of co-operation required[0] is really pretty different from > the situation of just throwing "Let's get a 3 and 2 split going here, > but we'll not decide who gets on the winning end of the deal right now > because we both think it'll be us." It's exactly the sort of thing that > would happen under an *organised* table-split, where you say "I'll get 3 > and you get 2 and we'll do it like this." But that wasn't the point of > this sort of deal, as I understand it. My expectation is, that the deal will be unspecified as to who gets the 2, and who gets the 3, only for an initial period where they are mutually assisting each other. Then when no other player seems a serious threat, the friendliness will start to dissolve. Perhaps then negotiation will open up between the two players trying to determine who gets the gamewin, or perhaps they will negotiate by bleeding each other :) I'm picturing something like, 2 rush decks find themselves predator A and prey B. They realize that unless they negotiate they will simply obliterate it each other, handing the grand predator E 2 vps. So they make a deal to split the table 3-2, but don't specify who gets the 3. The result would be players C and D get ousted by B. At this point B has 2 vps and A has zero. If one player is clearly stronger then the other, perhaps the weaker will see no chance of a gamewin, and accept the 2 vp position. If it's in contest, then A and B will probably negotiate in some way. They could talk it out, A could bleed B while B tries to oust E. Or they might just rush each other into oblivion, accidentally giving E the gamewin when E ousts both A and B :) -Matt Kanninen