[Question for LSJ]: Deals

Greetings. All right,let's take a highly hypothetical situation (not related to anything that has ever actually happened, mind). Let's say I'm playing a Gangrel rush deck; Badger is sending a vampire to torpor, but diablerizes with Amaranth instead. A blood hunt is called (of course). It happens that the winning votes belong to a player across the table, neither my predator nor my prey. May I ask him to vote against the blood hunt: a) Pretty please, with sugar on top? b) And I promise to pay him back by rushing his predator (or his prey)? c) Or else I'll rush _him_ next, and see how he likes it? d) And I promise that Gitane St Claire will lend her vote to all his political actions? e) None of the above? It has been argued that this sort of dealing in the middle of a vote is not allowed, since that's what the Succubus Club is for. How about that, is that true? Thanks, -- Sigmund

Sigmund Bjornstein wrote: > May I ask him to vote against the blood hunt: Yes. > a) Pretty please, with sugar on top? > b) And I promise to pay him back by rushing his predator (or his > prey)? > c) Or else I'll rush _him_ next, and see how he likes it? > d) And I promise that Gitane St Claire will lend her vote to all his > political actions? > e) None of the above? Any of the above (except e). Note that none of the terms specified are enforced by the rules - you are free to break your promises. > It has been argued that this sort of dealing in the middle of a vote > is not allowed, since that's what the Succubus Club is for. How about > that, is that true? Neither the Succubus Club nor the absense of the Succubus Club has any effect on the ability to table talk. Succubus Club adds the ability to make a few types of immediate trades (something for something right now - no future concerns), that's all. (card text). You are always free to make promises. You are also not bound to keep those. -- LSJ (vte...@white-wolf.com) V:TES Net.Rep for White Wolf, Inc. Links to revised rulebook, rulings, errata, and tournament rules: http://www.white-wolf.com/vtes/

On 1 Feb 2002 11:33:56 -0800, Sigmund Bjornstein wrote: >It has been argued that this sort of dealing in the middle of a vote >is not allowed, since that's what the Succubus Club is for. How about >that, is that true? Yes. In addition to the point you make, note that the player with the casting vote only has 15 seconds in which to do so. Players who tried to offer inducements, threats, counter-threats and so forth would disrupt the voting process. You'd get everyone trying to speak at once and it might not be clear whether the vote was actually cast during the hubbub. In the real world there are laws against this sort of thing. I've spent much time shivering outside polling stations because political representatives are not allowed inside to twist voters arms. And offering bribes and inducements is right out. But, as this is the World of Darkness and set in cities like Chicago and Miami, the game provides cards for players who want to indulge in such shenanigans. If you want other players to vote your way then you use cards like Bribes, Telepathic Vote Counting and Charming Lobby. But creating your own DIY game effects is not allowed. This is not the RPG or LARP; it's a card game. Andrew

In message <06209F0CBA34B6F0.4ABAC261...@lp.airnew s.net>, Andrew S. Davidson <a...@csi.com> writes: >In addition to the point you make, note that the player with the >casting vote only has 15 seconds in which to do so. You are mis-representing the rules. -- James Coupe but I lust after the raw pow0r of c. PGP 0x5D623D5D together with the humping great EBD690ECD7A1FB457CA2 elephant arse of gnome. 13D7E668C3695D623D5D - Vashti

Andrew S. Davidson <a...@csi.com> wrote in message news:<06209F0CBA34B6F0.4ABAC261...@lp.airnews.net>... > On 1 Feb 2002 11:33:56 -0800, Sigmund Bjornstein wrote: > > >It has been argued that this sort of dealing in the middle of a vote > >is not allowed, since that's what the Succubus Club is for. How about > >that, is that true? > > Yes. Oh, ANDREW!!! > In addition to the point you make, note that the player with the > casting vote only has 15 seconds in which to do so. Players who tried > to offer inducements, threats, counter-threats and so forth would > disrupt the voting process. You'd get everyone trying to speak at > once and it might not be clear whether the vote was actually cast > during the hubbub. Give it up. <snip real world griping> If > you want other players to vote your way then you use cards like > Bribes, Telepathic Vote Counting and Charming Lobby. But creating > your own DIY game effects is not allowed. This is not the RPG or > LARP; it's a card game. The chap is referring to a Bloodhunt, during which none of the above effects are allowed to be played. Table talk and gamesmanship is perfectly allowable by the rules, as you well know. Stop confusing the newbie! It's not big, it's not clever, and it's not your place to do so. Leave it to the professionals. DH "Prince Suitcase"

> In addition to the point you make, note that the player with the > casting vote only has 15 seconds in which to do so. This rule is only invoked when the issue begins to take too long. In fact, that's specifically mentioned in the rule. Your choice to only quote a portion of the rule out of context is an inappropriate answer. > In the real world there are laws against this sort of thing. I've > spent much time shivering outside polling stations because political > representatives are not allowed inside to twist voters arms. You're right - in the real world, all the bribes ("read my lips, no new taxes") and inducements happen WELL BEFORE any votes are cast. Perhpas, based on this real world consideration, we should require a waiting period of one year between the declaration of a vote and the casting of votes on the issue, to give every side an ample oppurtunity to make their case. >If you want other players to vote your way then you use cards like >Bribes, Telepathic Vote Counting and Charming Lobby. But creating >your own DIY game effects is not allowed. This is not the RPG or >LARP; it's a card game. It's a card game about VERY political creatures, with a mechanism to represent that. Deal-making is integral to the political portion of the game. The rules don't prohibit deal-making and table talk. Period. Now, when I play, I would like to see all the negotiations handled during a specific phase - usually before terms are announced. It does get tiresome to have votes negotiated at one point, then renegotiated later on, etc, etc. But as there is no rule in place for this, it will happen. Fanboy

>Oh, ANDREW!!! > >> In addition to the point you make, note that the player with the >> casting vote only has 15 seconds in which to do so. Players who tried >> to offer inducements, threats, counter-threats and so forth would >> disrupt the voting process. You'd get everyone trying to speak at >> once and it might not be clear whether the vote was actually cast >> during the hubbub. > >Give it up. > ><snip real world griping> You know, wouldn't that be an interesting idea? "Real World: VTES": "This is the true story of seven strangers, picked to live in a house [and to play Jyhad/VTES] to find out what happens when people stop being polite and start getting real. The Real World! So, we've had the UK players try to figure out who their best 10 players are. How about we have people suggest the 7 players they think would make for the most interesting Real World? =P Halcyan 2

In message <20020204090416...@mb-ch.aol.com>, Halcyan 2 <halc...@aol.com> writes: >How about we have people suggest the 7 players they think would make for the >most interesting Real World? Derek Ray Stefan Ferenci Mike Ooi Andrew S. Davidson Noal McDonald Xian Matt Green [ quoted text not captured ]

Andrew S. Davidson <a...@csi.com> wrote in message news:<06209F0CBA34B6F0.4ABAC261...@lp.airnews.net>... > On 1 Feb 2002 11:33:56 -0800, Sigmund Bjornstein wrote: > > >It has been argued that this sort of dealing in the middle of a vote > >is not allowed, since that's what the Succubus Club is for. How about > >that, is that true? > > Yes. Hm, and yet LSJ seems to think otherwise? I think I'll go with his call, unless he reverses. He _is_ the official rep, after all. -- Sigmund

>> On 1 Feb 2002 11:33:56 -0800, Sigmund Bjornstein wrote: >> >> >It has been argued that this sort of dealing in the middle of a vote >> >is not allowed, since that's what the Succubus Club is for. How about >> >that, is that true? >> >> Yes. > >Hm, and yet LSJ seems to think otherwise? I think I'll go with his >call, unless he reverses. He _is_ the official rep, after all. Please ignore Andrew. He likes to stir up trouble from time to time by pretending he doesn't understand the rules (even after they've been explained to him 2^nth times...). LSJ is indeed correct. Halcyan 2

> Please ignore Andrew. He likes to stir up trouble from time to time by > pretending he doesn't understand the rules (even after they've been explained > to him 2^nth times...). LSJ is indeed correct. Heehee 2^n. And as we all know, for sufficiently large n, and in this case we all know its really large n, 2^n is slower than n^2, n^3... n^99th etc. Now thats an asymptotically tight bound! Meaning... he really does this a lot. Wisefool Mercuriel

On 04 Feb 2002 23:31:48 GMT, Halcyan 2 wrote: >Please ignore Andrew. He likes to stir up trouble from time to time by >pretending he doesn't understand the rules There's no rule to understand here. There are no rules for negotiations, deals, threats, propaganda, etc. That's why, if you're playing the game strictly, they are not allowed. LSJ appears to have some personal rules for this but hasn't troubled to put them in the rulebook and therefore, so far as the official game is concerned, they don't exist. You will, of course, find that in practise judges will tell you that you can or can't do certain things. For example, if you whisper or gesticulate to another player, this may or may not be allowed. But this has no basis in the rules - they just make this stuff up according to their personal taste. Their taste usually seems to be an environment of honest dealing - where players make open public deals and always keep their word. This is wildly inappropriate for Vampire because: a) the World of Darkness background is one of inhuman monsters, secret conspiracies and Machiavellian intrigue. There are no good guys in this world - even the Society of Leopold is corrupt. Trading on your real-world, personal reputation rather than adopting the role of an evil Methusaleh destroys the role-playing feel of the game - an important element of the design. b) the game's designer, Richard Garfield, made it clear that he didn't want player interaction to be the stereotyped whining/finger-pointing/bash-the-leader dynamic which would reduce a multi-player game to a simple model, just as NCL focussed decks reduce the game to rock/scissors/paper. He analysed these outcomes in another article which I should perhaps reproduce. Vampire was supposed to solve this by forcing players to concentrate upon ousting their prey. Binding deals are often used to subvert this design aim and so they are not just ultra vires, they are actually bad for the game. Andrew

In message <39DDAA19A23854F4.F4DD9284...@lp.airnew s.net>, Andrew S. Davidson <a...@csi.com> writes: >On 04 Feb 2002 23:31:48 GMT, Halcyan 2 wrote: > >>Please ignore Andrew. He likes to stir up trouble from time to time by >>pretending he doesn't understand the rules > >There's no rule to understand here. You have been given a ruling on this by the official rules authority. Understand that. [ quoted text not captured ]

Andrew S. Davidson <a...@csi.com> wrote in message news:<39DDAA19A23854F4.F4DD9284...@lp.airnews.net>... > On 04 Feb 2002 23:31:48 GMT, Halcyan 2 wrote: > > >Please ignore Andrew. He likes to stir up trouble from time to time by > >pretending he doesn't understand the rules > > There's no rule to understand here. There are no rules for > negotiations, deals, threats, propaganda, etc. That's why, if you're > playing the game strictly, they are not allowed. This does not follow. If there are no rules against something, then the typical default assumption is that it is allowed. > LSJ appears to have some personal rules for this but hasn't troubled > to put them in the rulebook and therefore, so far as the official game > is concerned, they don't exist. He has confirmed what common sense should tell you ... that most forms of table talk are legal because there are no rules against them. > You will, of course, find that in practise judges will tell you that > you can or can't do certain things. For example, if you whisper or > gesticulate to another player, this may or may not be allowed. Secret dealing is frowned on or disallowed in tournaments because of rules against "collusion" and other forms of interaction or cheating which might be harder to enforce if secret dealing were permitted. Also, secret dealing is disruptive because the game is not designed to accomodate the time-outs required. > But > this has no basis in the rules - they just make this stuff up > according to their personal taste. Not quite. Such attitudes have some relationship to tournament rules designed to prevent certain forms of "cheating". > Their taste usually seems to be an > environment of honest dealing - where players make open public deals > and always keep their word. Wrong. The "taste" is simply towards open dealing, with no secret interactions that are kept from the Judge and the other players at the table. Deal breaking is permitted and even encouraged by most judges, at least in my experience. At my last tournament, the Judge practically advised a player that it was his duty to break a deal because he could thereby gain a victory point. The concern is that one is supposed to play to win, and to do otherwise is thought to stink of "collusion". > This is wildly inappropriate for Vampire > because: > > a) the World of Darkness background is one of inhuman monsters, secret > conspiracies and Machiavellian intrigue. There are no good guys in > this world - even the Society of Leopold is corrupt. Trading on your > real-world, personal reputation rather than adopting the role of an > evil Methusaleh destroys the role-playing feel of the game - an > important element of the design. Some players choose to keep deals, others don't. I say, let there be variety. Few players make a rule of always keeping deals (but some do, and this is allowed), but most good players usually keep deals and make exceptions only in high-stakes situations. This does not make them saintly, just a bit more sophisticated at "Machiavellian intrigue" than the average Sabbat !Brujah neonate sadist thug. > b) the game's designer, Richard Garfield, made it clear that he didn't > want player interaction to be the stereotyped > whining/finger-pointing/bash-the-leader dynamic which would reduce a > multi-player game to a simple model, just as NCL focussed decks reduce > the game to rock/scissors/paper. He analysed these outcomes in > another article which I should perhaps reproduce. Vampire was > supposed to solve this by forcing players to concentrate upon ousting > their prey. Binding deals are often used to subvert this design aim > and so they are not just ultra vires, they are actually bad for the > game. I believe we are now discussing apples and oranges. Deal breaking and deal making is very much a part of a wide variety of multiplayer games. I don't think it was this that Garfield sought to minimize, but rather the tendency of players in multiplayer games to gang up on and destroy the stronger player because he is considered a threat.

>> Halcyan 2 <halc...@aol.com> writes: >> How about we have people suggest the 7 players they think would make for the >> most interesting Real World? > > James Coupe <ja...@zephyr.org.uk> wrote: > Derek Ray > Stefan Ferenci > Mike Ooi > Andrew S. Davidson > Noal McDonald > Xian > Matt Green Heh. Only one problem with this list, we need women...at least 3 out of the 7. I also don't recall a Real World without at least one gay man or woman. Even though he's an tireless instigator online, I've never found Andrew to be very assertive or outgoing in person. I'm fairly certian that the very dominant personalities of Derek and I would cower him fairly quickly. So...with interpersonal conflict in mind, we replace him with Amy Thoma, the former Prince(ss) of Columbus, Ohio. Everyone who's from Ohio knows that she's a powder keg waiting to blow. I don't know anything about Matt Green, so I'd drop him for an attractive woman that loves conflict and has no problem standing up to men and kneecapping them to the ground. Unless anyone has any other suggestions, I'd suggest Matt Latham's wife, Jenny, for that role. The other woman should be laid back and easy ot get along with, so David Tatu's girlfriend, Robin Merrill, gets added and Mike Ooi gets dropped. To satisfy the other requirement, and to add a lot of conflict, I'd add James Coupe. I'd love to hang out with Xian, but having a French man in the same house and an British man should prove interesting, so I have to go with dropping him. So....here's my list: Derek Ray Stefan Ferenci James Coupe Noal McDonald Amy Thoma Jenny Latham Robin Merrill Regards, Noal

In message <bb705c59.02020...@posting.google.com>, Noal McDonald <dhar...@my-deja.com> writes: >Heh. Only one problem with this list, we need women...at least 3 out >of the 7. I also don't recall a Real World without at least one gay >man or woman. <snip> >James Coupe As I said to Matt Green when he greeted me with the words "Hello, you old queen", this is absolutely scandalous. [ quoted text not captured ]

James Coupe <ja...@zephyr.org.uk> wrote: > As I said to Matt Green when he greeted me with the words "Hello, you > old queen", this is absolutely scandalous. Heh. Ever known me to steer clear of scandal? *grin* Regards, Noal

On 5 Feb 2002 08:18:09 -0800, dhar...@my-deja.com (Noal McDonald) wrote: >>> Halcyan 2 <halc...@aol.com> writes: >>> How about we have people suggest the 7 players they think would >make for the >>> most interesting Real World? >> >> James Coupe <ja...@zephyr.org.uk> wrote: >> Derek Ray >> Stefan Ferenci >> Mike Ooi >> Andrew S. Davidson >> Noal McDonald >> Xian >> Matt Green > >Heh. Only one problem with this list, we need women...at least 3 out >of the 7. I also don't recall a Real World without at least one gay >man or woman. Somehow Noal, I've never pictured you as sitting at home watching The Real World. Only problem I see with your format is that 7-player V:TES sucks. Should make it 8 people so that you could break into two tables of four. >Even though he's an tireless instigator online, I've never found >Andrew to be very assertive or outgoing in person. I'm fairly certian >that the very dominant personalities of Derek and I would cower him >fairly quickly. So...with interpersonal conflict in mind, we replace >him with Amy Thoma, the former Prince(ss) of Columbus, Ohio. Everyone >who's from Ohio knows that she's a powder keg waiting to blow. Seeing as she's out of the picture nowadays, I'd go with Darcy Steele (Aaron's Wife) who knows how to play V:TES but would rather not. I'm thinking after awhile she'd go mental on the card junkies ;-) >I don't know anything about Matt Green, so I'd drop him for an >attractive woman that loves conflict and has no problem standing up to >men and kneecapping them to the ground. Unless anyone has any other >suggestions, I'd suggest Matt Latham's wife, Jenny, for that role. > >The other woman should be laid back and easy ot get along with, so >David Tatu's girlfriend, Robin Merrill, gets added and Mike Ooi gets >dropped. I'd be more inclined to say Niki Stewart. I think Niki would be less likely to put up with the guys bantering. >To satisfy the other requirement, and to add a lot of conflict, I'd >add James Coupe. I'd love to hang out with Xian, but having a French >man in the same house and an British man should prove interesting, so >I have to go with dropping him. For the Eighth person, it'd have to be LSJ. With all the rules questions being thrown around by Noal, Mike, and Derek his head should expand exponentially :-) Then James would be all fidgity not having much to say deferring to Scott.. The ladies not caring for all the male posturing/bickering kick all the men out of the house (except Mike Ooi for some reason) Anyhow.. >So....here's my list: > >Derek Ray >Stefan Ferenci >James Coupe >Noal McDonald >Amy Thoma >Jenny Latham >Robin Merrill > >Regards, >Noal My breakdown would end up as: LSJ James Coupe Noal McDonald Derek Ray Mike Ooi Jenny Latham Niki Stewart Darcy Steele Remember, Vampire is a Blood Sport :-) BernieTime

In message <bb705c59.02020...@posting.google.com>, Noal McDonald <dhar...@my-deja.com> writes: [ quoted text not captured ] I believe his follow-up line was to the effect of "Erm, you are, aren't you?" *sigh* [ quoted text not captured ]

"Noal McDonald" <dhar...@my-deja.com> wrote in message news:bb705c59.02020...@posting.google.com... > > James Coupe <ja...@zephyr.org.uk> wrote: > > Derek Ray > > Stefan Ferenci > > Mike Ooi > > Andrew S. Davidson > > Noal McDonald > > Xian > > Matt Green > [Noal] > To satisfy the other requirement, and to add a lot of conflict, I'd > add James Coupe. I'd love to hang out with Xian, but having a French > man in the same house and an British man should prove interesting, so > I have to go with dropping him. Ouch. :) Well, you'll get your chance at Origins...got my registration in and everything! So you'd better be there. Or else. I'm not going to come up with a list, as I thought James' was pretty good. Though I detected a strong scent of thug factionalism there. Heh. Xian probably included as just another pretty face

bernietime writes: >Somehow Noal, I've never pictured you as sitting at home watching >The Real World. Only problem I see with your format is that 7-player >V:TES sucks. Should make it 8 people so that you could break into >two tables of four. Nah Curt Adams (curt...@aol.com) "It is better to be wrong than to be vague" - Freeman Dyson

bernietime writes: >Somehow Noal, I've never pictured you as sitting at home watching >The Real World. Only problem I see with your format is that 7-player >V:TES sucks. Should make it 8 people so that you could break into >two tables of four. Nah, you need 7 players so you can have corny what-are-they- thinking-now interviews wilst great-grandprey and - predator take their turns. No time for filler chum in 4-player games. [ quoted text not captured ]

In message <a3pvpf$1a8ss2$1...@ID-123937.news.dfncis.de>, Xian <xi...@waste.org> writes: >I'm not going to come up with a list, as I thought James' was pretty good. >Though I detected a strong scent of thug factionalism there. Heh. Isn't that what the Real World type shows are all about? [ quoted text not captured ]

In message <3c604e98....@netnews.attbi.com>, berni...@attbi.comHOLDLeSPAM writes: >Then James would be all fidgity not having much to say deferring to >Scott.. The ladies not caring for all the male posturing/bickering kick >all the men out of the house (except Mike Ooi for some reason) There are, erm, other reasons why James would become fidgity in a house of LSJ, James Coupe, Noal McDonald, Derek Ray, Mike Ooi, Jenny Latham, Niki Stewart and Darcy Steele. But I'm saying nothing. [ quoted text not captured ]

In message <I8j20+ER...@gratiano.zephyr.org.uk>, James Coupe <ja...@zephyr.org.uk> mumbled something about: >There are, erm, other reasons why James would become fidgity in a house >of LSJ, James Coupe, Noal McDonald, Derek Ray, Mike Ooi, Jenny Latham, >Niki Stewart and Darcy Steele. > >But I'm saying nothing. That's just because Mike Ooi wouldn't be wearing pants. I can't BELIEVE y'all are talking about not having Mike Ooi in this house, by the way. He completely fits the role of the one Completely Wack Person that you always have to have on these shows, who's always one notch off kilter from the rest of the world. He's like, mandatory. -- "There's no gray. There's just white that's got grubby." -- T.P.

>That's just because Mike Ooi wouldn't be wearing pants. > >I can't BELIEVE y'all are talking about not having Mike Ooi in this >house, by the way. He completely fits the role of the one Completely >Wack Person that you always have to have on these shows, who's always >one notch off kilter from the rest of the world. He's like, mandatory. You know, the more and more I think about this, the more and more I think we could actually all pull this off! Maybe at some big convention (GenCon, etc.), we could keep the 7 "Chosen ones" locked up in the same hotel room. Set up a few video cameras and we're all a go! (And we'll occassionally be nice and let them outside for a walk)... =P Halcyan 2

In message <m4816uorkm78a29uh...@4ax.com>, Derek Ray <lor...@yahoo.com> writes: >>There are, erm, other reasons why James would become fidgity in a house >>of LSJ, James Coupe, Noal McDonald, Derek Ray, Mike Ooi, Jenny Latham, >>Niki Stewart and Darcy Steele. >> >>But I'm saying nothing. > >That's just because Mike Ooi wouldn't be wearing pants. If you say so. *nods sagely* [ quoted text not captured ]

On 5 Feb 2002 06:18:56 -0800, John B. Whelan wrote: >This does not follow. If there are no rules against something, then >the typical default assumption is that it is allowed. That's true of live action games like LARP, paintball etc. That's because you have the laws of the real world to constrain you - both legal and physical. This doesn't work in board and card games because there are few physical limits and the characters can suffer nasty fates without any legal consequences. Try your default assumption on the following and tell me if I can do it without a card effect: * lend pool * show my cards * change seats * hide the edge * make noises (I brought a duck call to the London event as a Malkavian prop but forgot to use it) >Secret dealing is frowned on or disallowed in tournaments because of >rules against "collusion" and other forms of interaction or cheating >which might be harder to enforce if secret dealing were permitted. >Also, secret dealing is disruptive because the game is not designed to >accomodate the time-outs required. Table-talk consumes plenty of time whether it's secret or not. And listening to in-game talk is no safeguard against pre-game collusion. By definition, that has already happened beforehand. >Wrong. The "taste" is simply towards open dealing, with no secret >interactions that are kept from the Judge and the other players at the >table. Deal breaking is permitted and even encouraged by most judges, >at least in my experience. At my last tournament, the Judge >practically advised a player that it was his duty to break a deal >because he could thereby gain a victory point. The concern is that >one is supposed to play to win, and to do otherwise is thought to >stink of "collusion". I recall your incredulity when I put forward the proposition that a player could be required to break a deal. It's good to see that you now accept this. That's mainly what I'm after - a general acceptance that players should always act in their own interest and break deals when they are no longer useful - helping another player more than they help themselves. Deals which depend upon a level of trust which implies collusion should no longer be possible. >Some players choose to keep deals, others don't. I say, let there be >variety. Unfortunately this doesn't work. A team is stronger than a group of individuals. The players who always keep their word will cooperate with other and ostracise the others. This will be done by out-of-game, cross-game methods - reputation, secret handshakes, etc. Collusion is too powerful to be allowed to exist in any form. >Few players make a rule of always keeping deals Really? I've heard more than one UK player say words to the effect that "I always keep my word". Paul was one example on Saturday - he wouldn't bleed his prey when he had left himself wide open. >I believe we are now discussing apples and oranges. Deal breaking and >deal making is very much a part of a wide variety of multiplayer >games. I don't think it was this that Garfield sought to minimize, >but rather the tendency of players in multiplayer games to gang up on >and destroy the stronger player because he is considered a threat. I've already posted one of his articles here - did you see that? Time for another perhaps - it's best to read his words direct. Andrew

Andrew S. Davidson wrote: > That's true of live action games like LARP, paintball etc. That's > because you have the laws of the real world to constrain you - both > legal and physical. This doesn't work in board and card games because > there are few physical limits and the characters can suffer nasty > fates without any legal consequences. Try your default assumption on > the following and tell me if I can do it without a card effect: > > * lend pool No, but if you are considered the controller of your own pool, then it should fall within the rules handling a change of controller. > * show my cards If I don't recall wrongly the above happens to be explicitly forbidden. > * change seats As the mechanism for determining seating order is rather welldefined in the rules the above example falls. > * hide the edge I think you are indeed allowed to do the above - until the moment anyone asks for the edge at which time you must show it again. > * make noises (I brought a duck call to the London event as a > Malkavian prop but forgot to use it) Most definitely allowed but probably handled as in most multiplayer/ team -games. A present judge will on a case to case basis determine if those noises are 'unsportmanslike' or not, and this only after a formal complaint has been voiced. > <snip the rest> It would seem that you would need another set of examples in order to make your point - and by all means do. I enjoy reading the pointless verbal bashing far too much to want it to go away ;) Sten During

> You know, wouldn't that be an interesting idea? "Real World: VTES": > > "This is the true story of seven strangers, picked to live in a house [and to > play Jyhad/VTES] to find out what happens when people stop being polite and > start getting real. The Real World! > > > So, we've had the UK players try to figure out who their best 10 players are. > How about we have people suggest the 7 players they think would make for the > most interesting Real World? > > =P OK, I've bypassed most of the suggestions that followed, since they seemed predominantly Americanised in selection (with the expection of James Coupe, who must be feeling like a pig in mud at some of the suggestions...). As with all great MTV shows, there has to be a blatent rip off by MTV Europe!!! 7 EUROPEAN people... Legbiter (the host for this series, at stately Legbiter Manor) Anam Stubbington (one of two ladies on the UK VTES scene) Mike Ooi (who was such a hit in the US show that they payed 3 times the going rate to ensure his presence in this cheap sequal) Reyda (because!) Carl Pilhatsch (to bring some decorum on the series) Jackie Eves (the only other lady on the UK VTES scene) Barny Baker (Guardian of the Bar. +1 stealth when buying a round) DH

In message <9e10847c.02020...@posting.google.com>, hamdamcwa <dave...@hotmail.com> writes: >OK, I've bypassed most of the suggestions that followed, since they >seemed predominantly Americanised in selection (with the expection of >James Coupe, who must be feeling like a pig in mud at some of the >suggestions...). I like the suggestion that involved me, Matt Green, Derek Ray and Xian. *cackle* [ quoted text not captured ]

Andrew Davidson wrote: >I recall your incredulity when I put forward the proposition that a >player could be required to break a deal. Then you recall something that I do not. When have we had previous debate? I suspect you mistake me for someone else, or else this was very long ago. >It's good to see that you >now accept this. I don't. I was merely reporting the attitude of the Judge about how he personally felt the game should be played. (He was not, BTW, making a ruling. He had no authority to do so as he was playing in the game himself under the multi-Judge system. He was merely expressing an opinion on how folks should play.) I believe that the only circumstances in which a person should be "required to break a deal" is if the original deal was itself illegal .. ie. was originally motivated by some other reason than attempting to win. But if the original deal was made in the proper spirit, then a player should not be required to break it just because he finds it no longer in his interest. Players should not be required to keep deals, but neither should they be forced to break them. Last time I checked, this was still the official position. > That's mainly what I'm after - a general acceptance >that players should always act in their own interest and break deals >when they are no longer useful - helping another player more than they >help themselves. General game theory suggests that while deal-breakers do well in the short run, they tend to do worse in the long run. And the longer the "long run" is, the worse the idea of deal-breaking becomes. If the "Eternal Struggle" were truly eternal (and in a sense it is, because the Methuselahs are always returning to the table) then it may well be that deal-breaking is never a good idea. But if one is going to break a deal, it makes sense to do so when the stakes are high. For instance, a smart Methuselah might always keep his word ... except in the final round of tournament with a hefty prize. Or he might only break his word when it is given to strangers whom he does not expect to play again with any regularity. But my attitude is ... the stakes are NEVER high. It's just a card game, and the most I ever got for participating in a Tournament was a $100.00 box of cards. Poor as I am, that is still small potatoes in the ultimate scheme of things, and hardly worth sacrificing the value of my given word. If it is ever decreed that players MUST break deals, I'll simply stop making them. Deal making is only valuable if people trust you anyway, so there is hardly much point if there is "general acceptance" that deals must be broken. If one's word is worthless, then there is nothing it can buy. Of course, me and my playgroup can play with the understanding that deals should be broken. I this case, I can make a promise, and the recipient of the promise will know I don't really mean it, and I will know he knows this, and therefore, in effect, it is not really a promise at all, and my integrity is in no way affected when I break the (essentially non-existent) deal. I won't say there is NO point to the above situation. Essentially they have agreed to play a game of bluff where each tries to guess when the other is lying. It also has the advantage of reducing the amount of promise-making deals (since there is no longer any point to them), which is good if you do not like the deal-making aspect of the game. But the "bluff" aspect will apply only to lies about current game information (like what is in your hand or deck), since promises will be dismissed as irrelevant. But if you really want to play the roll of an "evil" Methuselah who breaks his promises, then you will not get anywhere unless you actually fool someone into trusting you. This is impossible under the "general acceptance" system you advocate. In order to be fooled by an "evil" Methuselah whe breaks his promises, one must believe, at least hypothetically, in a "good" Methuselah who does not break them -- which cannot be if the latter is actually outlawed (except to the extent that one's victims are ignorant of the rules). It is the very nature of evil that it must prey on good to gain any advantage. Treachery, to be valuable, must prey on trust. If you outlaw good, there is nothing for Evil to take advantage of, and no possibility of Treachery. If you really think that Treachery is an important aspect of the game (and I agree with you that it is), then it would be a bad thing if you were to obtain the general acceptance that you advocate. The game should have at least some honest Methuselahs who mean what they say and follow through on their word. If honest folk did not exist, then confidence men would be out of work. It is not necessary that the victims be honest, but it is necessary that victims believe in the possibility of honesty in others. I fancy that the con-men in Hell do very poor business. -- John Whelan

Nystulc wrote: > I believe that the only circumstances in which a person should be "required > to break a deal" is if the original deal was itself illegal .. ie. was > originally motivated by some other reason than attempting to win. But if > the original deal was made in the proper spirit, then a player should not be > required to break it just because he finds it no longer in his interest. Correct. This has been brought up before and received the same answer then as well (from me). -- LSJ (vte...@white-wolf.com) V:TES Net.Rep for White Wolf, Inc. Links to revised rulebook, rulings, errata, and tournament rules: http://www.white-wolf.com/vtes/

> I like the suggestion that involved me, Matt Green, Derek Ray and Xian. > > *cackle* You are a sick puppy! DH

Andrew S. Davidson <a...@csi.com> wrote in message news:<FFD40D7A3F294B7D.F2CCC0C3...@lp.airnews.net>... > On 5 Feb 2002 06:18:56 -0800, John B. Whelan wrote: <SNIP> > >Few players make a rule of always keeping deals > > Really? I've heard more than one UK player say words to the effect > that "I always keep my word". Paul was one example on Saturday - he > wouldn't bleed his prey when he had left himself wide open. I was another of those who came out with that statement at Saturday's event - I know that Ross (Howard, who also attended the game) thinks similarly. As a personal rule, I don't tend to break in-game agreements (I can't recall having done so to date), though I will stick to the letter of them - for instance, I cut a deal with Jackie not to bleed her on my next turn in order to secure her support for a vote, then hit her with a Kine Resources Contested instead (I would also have considered redirecting a bleed to her acceptable under the terms of the agreement). I accept that many players will break a deal if it is beneficial for them, but I hold the view that people will be more likely to take up your deals if they believe you will abide by them (e.g. you have a good reputation for sticking to your deals) - I believe one of the tips on the ELDB is something along the lines of 'never expect a dealbreaker to keep to their deals'? Whilst it is arguably using knowledge from outside the immediate game, could anyone say that they cwould be able to weigh up whether to accept a deal offered by someone that they know has a record of breaking deals without that knowledge affecting their decision (compared to someone they know has a reputation for holding to a deal, even if it costs them)? Whilst (by the tournament rules) you must play with the aim of obtaining a game win, and of course you should not accept a deal that will detriment you without a benefit which outweighs such in terms of advancing your chances of securing a game win (e.g. voting for a referendum that disadvantages you in order to secure someone else's votes for your next political action would, I think, be acceptable in the majority of player's minds), surely this would not force you to break a deal if the situation changed? Dealmaking is a key part of the game - to force someone to break a deal (rather than giving them the option to) is, in my opinion, a bad idea. In other words, take the following situations: i) Player A cuts a deal with player B, their prey, to not bleed him on the next turn in return for them rushing and taking out the nasty, killer minion of Player C, A's predator, a vampire which is causing A extreme problems for some reason (perhaps they have +1 innate stealth, or are a combat monster who keeps knocking A's minions into torpor, whatever). B successfully does so and taps out. It comes around to A's turn, and A realises he could now bleed B out. ii) Same situation, but player A gets bled badly by C before it rolls around to his turn again, and if he does not bleed out player B, it is 99% certain he will be ousted by C on C's next turn - the six pool could save him... Certainly A could decide to break the deal, but in either case would the current tournament rules force player A to break the deal, even if they would prefer to choose not to (even at the cost of being ousted next turn)? In my opinion, as when the deal was cut it was done with the aim of furthering A's position, they should have the option of sticking to it even though it could now cost them. Opinions/rulings? Can this tournament rule force you to break a deal made in good faith against your wishes? - Rafe

"Nystulc" <nys...@cs.com> wrote in message news:20020206100111...@mb-bh.news.cs.com... > Andrew Davidson wrote: > > >I recall your incredulity when I put forward the proposition that a > >player could be required to break a deal. > Then you recall something that I do not. When have we had previous debate? I > suspect you mistake me for someone else, or else this was very long ago. > > >It's good to see that you > >now accept this. > > I don't. I was merely reporting the attitude of the Judge about how he > personally felt the game should be played. (He was not, BTW, making a > ruling. He had no authority to do so as he was playing in the game himself > under the multi-Judge system. He was merely expressing an opinion on how folks > should play.) Oh. Um, that would be me, wouldn't it? John, I didn't mean to suggest that the player was *required* to break his deal, or even that he *should* be required to (and I'm certain that he wouldn't have been influenced by my opinion one way or the other; he's very much capable of making up his own mind about this kind of thing). I did think it was foolish to rely on a deal to keep you alive at the mercy of your predator, because your predator almost never gains anything by keeping you alive that's worth the 6 pool and VP that he gains by getting you killed. My opinion is not that people shouldn't be allowed to keep deals, but that it is very much legitimate to break them, and that in general people shouldn't *expect* deals to be kept when a VP is immediately at stake. This *is* only a game, and as such your word is not your bond in the way that it is in "real life". Much like in Diplomacy, back-stabbing should (IMO) be expected when the backstabber will gain enough (in-game) by it. High out-of-game stakes (as in prizes, fame, etc) aren't (again IMO) required for deal-breaking to become likely. > I believe that the only circumstances in which a person should be "required to > break a deal" is if the original deal was itself illegal .. ie. was originally > motivated by some other reason than attempting to win. But if the original > deal was made in the proper spirit, then a player should not be required to > break it just because he finds it no longer in his interest. I agree. A deal legally made (as LSJ has written on more than one occasion) can be legally kept. But it's not *required* to be kept any more than it's required to be broken. On the other hand, many deals that could be offered in a game are not really (IMO) legal. Offering to help someone get 3 VPs in exchange for letting you have the last 2 is not (IMO) legal unless it's already entirely impossible for you to win the game yourself - and it is very rarely *impossible*; unlikeliness isn't enough justification (to me) to make this deal legal. (Again, I don't mean to imply anything about the particular deal you offered to your predator in that particular game - it was, as I recall, a perfectly legitimate deal; it just also happened to be one that your predator would have gained nothing by keeping. If it's not possible for you to exact retribution when someone breaks a deal, it's probably not be wise to offer that deal in the first place.) > General game theory suggests that while deal-breakers do well in the short run, > they tend to do worse in the long run. And the longer the "long run" is, the > worse the idea of deal-breaking becomes. I may be mistaken here, but doesn't "general" game theory deal more with "real life" "games" than the kind of recreational games that we're talking about? And given that long-term "cooperation" (ie cross-game, even beyond a certain point in-game) is already prohibited by VEKN tournament rules, doesn't that imply that cooperation can't be (legally) the winning strategy in VTES? > But my attitude is ... the stakes are NEVER high. It's just a card game, and > the most I ever got for participating in a Tournament was a $100.00 box of > cards. Poor as I am, that is still small potatoes in the ultimate scheme of > things, and hardly worth sacrificing the value of my given word. See, my attitude is that your given word doesn't *have* much value within a game of VTES. Since it's only a game, and treachery is (IMO) part of that game, it's only worth *keeping* your word when you can expect to gain something by doing so (eg the ability to make further deals with that player during that game). > If one's word is worthless, then there is nothing it can buy. Right. Players should only be willing to work together in a game of VTES when it's actually to *both* of their advantages to do so. If word-keeping is required for both of them to benefit, it's generally not a deal that should be made. (again, IMO.) > If honest folk did not exist, then confidence men would be out of work. It is > not necessary that the victims be honest, but it is necessary that victims > believe in the possibility of honesty in others. I fancy that the con-men in > Hell do very poor business. I'd actually like to see con-men do poor business in VTES too. I don't like people getting jedi-mind-tricked into doing stupid things to another player's benefit, or bamboozled into thinking somebody's going to keep a deal that won't be to the other person's benefit once they've fulfilled their end of the bargain. I think the game would work better if everyone recognized that it's only in any other player's interest to help you as long as it helps them too, and therefore not expect help (or deals to be kept) beyond that point. As in some cases in the "real world", if you're not bargaining from a position of strength, you're not bargaining at all, you're just begging for mercy. Josh is it... an eeeeevil petting zoo?

"Nystulc" <nys...@cs.com> wrote in message news:20020206100111...@mb-bh.news.cs.com... > Andrew Davidson wrote: > > >I recall your incredulity when I put forward the proposition that a > >player could be required to break a deal. > Then you recall something that I do not. When have we had previous debate? I > suspect you mistake me for someone else, or else this was very long ago. > > >It's good to see that you > >now accept this. > > I don't. I was merely reporting the attitude of the Judge about how he > personally felt the game should be played. (He was not, BTW, making a > ruling. He had no authority to do so as he was playing in the game himself > under the multi-Judge system. He was merely expressing an opinion on how folks > should play.) Oh. Um, that would be me, wouldn't it? John, I didn't mean to suggest that the player was *required* to break his deal, or even that he *should* be required to (and I'm certain that he wouldn't have been influenced by my opinion one way or the other; he's very much capable of making up his own mind about this kind of thing). I did think it was foolish to rely on a deal to keep you alive at the mercy of your predator, because your predator almost never gains anything by keeping you alive that's worth the 6 pool and VP that he gains by getting you killed. My opinion is not that people shouldn't be allowed to keep deals, but that it is very much legitimate to break them, and that in general people shouldn't *expect* deals to be kept when a VP is immediately at stake. This *is* only a game, and as such your word is not your bond in the way that it is in "real life". Much like in Diplomacy, back-stabbing should (IMO) be expected when the backstabber will gain enough (in-game) by it. High out-of-game stakes (as in prizes, fame, etc) aren't (again IMO) required for deal-breaking to become likely. > I believe that the only circumstances in which a person should be "required to > break a deal" is if the original deal was itself illegal .. ie. was originally > motivated by some other reason than attempting to win. But if the original > deal was made in the proper spirit, then a player should not be required to > break it just because he finds it no longer in his interest. I agree. A deal legally made (as LSJ has written on more than one occasion) can be legally kept. But it's not *required* to be kept any more than it's required to be broken. On the other hand, many deals that could be offered in a game are not really (IMO) legal. Offering to help someone get 3 VPs in exchange for letting you have the last 2 is not (IMO) legal unless it's already entirely impossible for you to win the game yourself - and it is very rarely *impossible*; unlikeliness isn't enough justification (to me) to make this deal legal. (Again, I don't mean to imply anything about the particular deal you offered to your predator in that particular game - it was, as I recall, a perfectly legitimate deal; it just also happened to be one that your predator would have gained nothing by keeping. If it's not possible for you to exact retribution when someone breaks a deal, it's probably not be wise to offer that deal in the first place.) > General game theory suggests that while deal-breakers do well in the short run, > they tend to do worse in the long run. And the longer the "long run" is, the > worse the idea of deal-breaking becomes. I may be mistaken here, but doesn't "general" game theory deal more with "real life" "games" than the kind of recreational games that we're talking about? And given that long-term "cooperation" (ie cross-game, even beyond a certain point in-game) is already prohibited by VEKN tournament rules, doesn't that imply that cooperation can't be (legally) the winning strategy in VTES? > But my attitude is ... the stakes are NEVER high. It's just a card game, and > the most I ever got for participating in a Tournament was a $100.00 box of > cards. Poor as I am, that is still small potatoes in the ultimate scheme of > things, and hardly worth sacrificing the value of my given word. See, my attitude is that your given word doesn't *have* much value within a game of VTES. Since it's only a game, and treachery is (IMO) part of that game, it's only worth *keeping* your word when you can expect to gain something by doing so (eg the ability to make further deals with that player during that game). > If one's word is worthless, then there is nothing it can buy. Right. Players should only be willing to work together in a game of VTES when it's actually to *both* of their advantages to do so. If word-keeping is required for both of them to benefit, it's generally not a deal that should be made. (again, IMO.) > If honest folk did not exist, then confidence men would be out of work. It is > not necessary that the victims be honest, but it is necessary that victims > believe in the possibility of honesty in others. I fancy that the con-men in > Hell do very poor business. I'd actually like to see con-men do poor business in [ quoted text not captured ]

Joshua Duffin wrote: > "Nystulc" <nys...@cs.com> wrote in message > > General game theory suggests that while deal-breakers do well in the short > run, > > they tend to do worse in the long run. And the longer the "long run" is, > the > > worse the idea of deal-breaking becomes. > > I may be mistaken here, but doesn't "general" game theory > deal more with "real life" "games" than the kind of > recreational games that we're talking about? And given No. A contrived (not exactly real-world) example built to conform to the following scenario: Two players have the opportunity to cooperate (keep the deal) or defect (break the deal) - with the decision being made simultaneously. If both coopoerate, they score 3 point each on some reward scale. If both defect, then score 1 point each. If one defects and the other cooperates, the defector gets 5 points and the other gets 0. In an isolated "game" of the above, you should always defect. You will invariably score better that way. The game gets interesting when iterated and applied (pairwise) to larger groups. In that case (with suitable set-up conditions), it is better to cooperate with a given partner upon the initial meeting, and then in each subsequent meeting, to choose the action that was the partner last chose (the "Tit-for-tat" algorithm. > that long-term "cooperation" (ie cross-game, even beyond > a certain point in-game) is already prohibited by VEKN > tournament rules, doesn't that imply that cooperation > can't be (legally) the winning strategy in VTES? The issue of trust being based on out-of-game criteria has been raised before. The current solution allows you to trust (or not) as you wish. [ quoted text not captured ]

>If both coopoerate, they score 3 point each on some reward scale. >If both defect, then score 1 point each. >If one defects and the other cooperates, the defector gets 5 points >and the other gets 0. Ha ha! It's like a twisted game of Stag Hunt where you have the additional option of going cannibalistic, backstabbing the other player, and eating *him* instead of stags or bunnies! =P Halcyan 2

"LSJ" <vte...@white-wolf.com> wrote in message news:3C615F91...@white-wolf.com... > A contrived (not exactly real-world) example built to conform > to the following scenario: Two players have the opportunity to > cooperate (keep the deal) or defect (break the deal) - with the > decision being made simultaneously. > > If both coopoerate, they score 3 point each on some reward scale. > If both defect, then score 1 point each. > If one defects and the other cooperates, the defector gets 5 points > and the other gets 0. > > In an isolated "game" of the above, you should always defect. > You will invariably score better that way. > > The game gets interesting when iterated and applied (pairwise) > to larger groups. In that case (with suitable set-up conditions), > it is better to cooperate with a given partner upon the initial > meeting, and then in each subsequent meeting, to choose the > action that was the partner last chose (the "Tit-for-tat" > algorithm. OK. Obviously I don't know much about game theory. :-) Do you know of any analyses that deal with games where the cooperate/defect decision is *not* made simultaneously? It seems to me it'd be a closer analogy to most VTES deals, since (usually) one person takes care of their end of the bargain on their turn and then the other person doesn't have to follow through until their own turn comes up. In the game you posited, I'd imagine that, knowing this to be the case, the first player to decide would have to choose to defect (since he knows that if he cooperates, the second player would gain an additional 2 points by defecting). But I could easily be wrong again. :-) > The issue of trust being based on out-of-game criteria has > been raised before. > > The current solution allows you to trust (or not) as you wish. I didn't mean to imply that trusting would be illegal, but only that it's not legal to pre-arrange to cooperate with players across games independent of the in-game situation. (ie you have to play to win for yourself, not to simultaneously maximize both your own and another person's VPs.) My leap that "always cooperate" therefore can't be the winning strategy in dealmaking may be inaccurate. :-) Josh and if you're this this this full of bitterness now someday it will just fill you

Joshua Duffin wrote: > Do you know of any analyses that deal with games where > the cooperate/defect decision is *not* made simultaneously? > It seems to me it'd be a closer analogy to most VTES deals, > since (usually) one person takes care of their end of the > bargain on their turn and then the other person doesn't > have to follow through until their own turn comes up. True, but the difference is negligible. The VTES situation benefits the person who chooses second, but not with any measurable effect beyond the first or last encounter (depending on the other player's actions). If the person who goes first defects, then the second is spared one stab in the back. As the process is iterated more and more times, the effect of this boon becomes negligible. If the first is cooperative, then the second gets a "free" defection at the end (if the end can be detected - and in general, it is assumed not to be detectable). > In the game you posited, I'd imagine that, knowing this > to be the case, the first player to decide would have > to choose to defect (since he knows that if he cooperates, > the second player would gain an additional 2 points by > defecting). But I could easily be wrong again. :-) The iteration is the key. Knowing that the process will be iterated, the player that goes second would do well to coorperate (in order to "buy" a spirit of cooperation in his partner for the next time). Any time iteration is not a factor, both partners should defect (going first, second, or simultaneous being moot). [ quoted text not captured ]

Joshua Duffin wrote: > OK. Obviously I don't know much about game theory. :-) For more about this case (called the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma), see http://www.generation5.org/ipd.shtml http://www.agorics.com/Library/agoricpapers/ce/ce2.html http://www.pscs.umich.edu/Software/CC/ECHome/ECCitationClassic.html [ quoted text not captured ]

"LSJ" <vte...@white-wolf.com> wrote in message news:3C6191BF...@white-wolf.com... > The iteration is the key. > Knowing that the process will be iterated, the player that goes > second would do well to coorperate (in order to "buy" a spirit > of cooperation in his partner for the next time). > > Any time iteration is not a factor, both partners should defect > (going first, second, or simultaneous being moot). Interesting. And thanks for the links. It does seem to me, though, that the Prisoner's Dilemma game isn't very analogous to VTES deals (at least the ones I've seen). For one thing, in VTES it's not really feasible to cooperate for the entire game with another player. (One of you has to get ousted for the game to end, barring a mutual-withdrawal pact, and even then you're still competing to win the game.) That is, there are (IMO) no deals in VTES that in the long-term can be good for everybody (though there may be some in the short term). Or, my take is that the payoffs in VTES are such that cooperating every time (or playing the tit-for-tat strategy) is not a recipe for winning. If, for example, player A offers player B, his prey, a deal that A won't oust B on his next turn, in return for B using his Bum's Rushes on his own prey instead of on A, it's then in A's interest (once B doesn't rush him) to go ahead and oust B anyway (if it's in his power to do so). The ability to have B trust him in the future will almost certainly not pay off in an amount greater than the 1 VP that defecting gets him now. (This is because generally it's almost never going to be in B's interest to outright help A gain VPs in the future. The deals it will be in B's interest to make may have some benefits to A, but as far as I can see, not generally anything large enough to outweigh a VP.) This is still not to say that A couldn't keep the deal and not oust B. It's just that in my opinion, it's almost never *truly* worthwhile for him to do so. The downside of being known as a "dealbreaker" under those circumstances doesn't outweigh getting even a single VP - being known as a "dealkeeper" will never actually gain you VPs unless people are outright paying you back for favors you've done them in other games - and that I do think is not legal under VEKN tournament rules. Josh i know this bar with a jukebox full of medicine

Joshua Duffin wrote: > > "LSJ" <vte...@white-wolf.com> wrote in message > news:3C6191BF...@white-wolf.com... > > > The iteration is the key. > > Knowing that the process will be iterated, the player that goes > > second would do well to coorperate (in order to "buy" a spirit > > of cooperation in his partner for the next time). > > > > Any time iteration is not a factor, both partners should defect > > (going first, second, or simultaneous being moot). > > Interesting. And thanks for the links. It does seem > to me, though, that the Prisoner's Dilemma game isn't > very analogous to VTES deals (at least the ones I've > seen). For one thing, in VTES it's not really feasible > to cooperate for the entire game with another player. ? I've seen it happen more often than defection. > (One of you has to get ousted for the game to end, > barring a mutual-withdrawal pact, and even then you're > still competing to win the game.) That is, there are Ah. Then you don't make the deal. I was refering to cooperate/defect in terms of deal-making. Any deal is a "game" in which you cooperate by keeping your end of the deal and defect by not. > (IMO) no deals in VTES that in the long-term can be > good for everybody (though there may be some in the > short term). Or, my take is that the payoffs in VTES > are such that cooperating every time (or playing the > tit-for-tat strategy) is not a recipe for winning. In a game (or series of games) you can make a series of deals with the same player. The "rules" would have to be extended to encapsulate the idea that makingthe deal is optional and that someone may have less of an inclination to make a deal with a "known" defector, but the results shouldn't be far from the ones given for the classic IPD. > If, for example, player A offers player B, his prey, > a deal that A won't oust B on his next turn, in > return for B using his Bum's Rushes on his own prey > instead of on A, it's then in A's interest (once B > doesn't rush him) to go ahead and oust B anyway (if > it's in his power to do so). The ability to have Not if this impairs his ability to make deals with the other players (with the assumption that there would be opportunities to make beneficial deals with the other players). Besides, most deals don't involve the "oust-on-defect" trait. > This is still not to say that A couldn't keep the > deal and not oust B. It's just that in my opinion, > it's almost never *truly* worthwhile for him to do > so. So B should weigh that in making the deal (and in not defecting) in the first place. > The downside of being known as a "dealbreaker" > under those circumstances doesn't outweigh getting > even a single VP - being known as a "dealkeeper" > will never actually gain you VPs unless people are > outright paying you back for favors you've done > them in other games - and that I do think is not > legal under VEKN tournament rules. Paying back favors? No. Making (and honoring) deals (or not) based on some idea of trustworthiness of a given player (which may be impacted by a reputation as a deal-breaker)? Yes. [ quoted text not captured ]

"hamdamcwa" <dave...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:9e10847c.02020...@posting.google.com... (snip) > OK, I've bypassed most of the suggestions that followed, since they > seemed predominantly Americanised in selection thinking the same thing ;) > 7 EUROPEAN people... > > Legbiter (the host for this series, at stately Legbiter Manor) > Anam Stubbington (one of two ladies on the UK VTES scene) > Mike Ooi (who was such a hit in the US show that they payed 3 times > the going rate to ensure his presence in this cheap sequal) > Reyda (because!) thank you =) it's good to have some free, unbiased, upright support from abroad. (hmmm... Dave, the parcel is on its way. those 52 freak drives and 17 nephandus should be enough, heh) by the way i'd love to meet Mike and Anam =) [ quoted text not captured ]

Noal McDonald wrote: > > So....here's my list: > > Derek Ray > Stefan Ferenci > James Coupe > Noal McDonald > Amy Thoma > Jenny Latham > Robin Merrill > > Regards, > Noal I want to be the camera man! Or the foley artist. Raille

dhar...@my-deja.com (Noal McDonald) wrote in message news:<bb705c59.02020...@posting.google.com>... > <snip> Mike Ooi gets dropped <snip> None of this dropping Mike Ooi...I got to watch the looks on everyone else's faces as they watched Mike drop his pants in Lafayette. I'd have paid money to see the intant replay of the "wonder/amazement/shock" cycle on 3/4 of the tournament field. It was a priceless RealWorld moment. :)

Josh Duffin wrote: >Oh. Um, that would be me, wouldn't it? Hi Josh. Uh, yes in fact. Though it was not my intent to bring anyone up in particular. Hardly necessary really since, in my years of playing V:tES, I have never met any player, much less a judge, who felt that deals should be enforced by the rules. >John, I didn't mean to suggest that the player was >*required* to break his deal, or even that he *should* >be required to Nor did I mean to imply that. If it sounded as though I was in any way criticising your behavior, as player or judge, then I appologise. That was certainly not my intent, and I certainly have no grounds for complaint in any event. The previous poster had complained that Judges at tournaments tend to oppose deal-breaking. This has certainly not been true in my experience (nor do I think it should be true) and I merely cited my experience and used you as a counterexample. It was certainly not intended as a diatribe against deal-breakers and the evil Judges who support them. In fact the poster who responded assumed I was in agreement with the Judge (close enough), but falsely assumed we both agreed with his extreme position that deal-keeping should be outlawed. I was forced to clarify that this was certainly not true in my case, and probably not in yours either, since you had not in fact attempted to make a ruling against deal-keeping. I was trying to clarify that you had done nothing inappropriate either way. BTW, I had great fun at the tournament. Many thanks. -- John Whelan

> > 7 EUROPEAN people... > > > > Legbiter (the host for this series, at stately Legbiter Manor) > > Anam Stubbington (one of two ladies on the UK VTES scene) > > Mike Ooi (who was such a hit in the US show that they payed 3 times > > the going rate to ensure his presence in this cheap sequal) > > Reyda (because!) > > thank you =) it's good to have some free, unbiased, upright support from > abroad. > > (hmmm... Dave, the parcel is on its way. those 52 freak drives and 17 > nephandus should be enough, heh) Aw man! All I wanted was a Carrion Coffin! > by the way i'd love to meet Mike and Anam =) No. You would not. ;) DH

"Noal McDonald" <dhar...@my-deja.com> wrote in message news:bb705c59.02020...@posting.google.com... > I don't know anything about Matt Green.... Well Noal, I'm 5'11", single and from southeast England. My vital statistics are 38-30-32 and i look pretty buff in a swim suit.* My hobbies include; competitive card games, motorcycling, entomology and charity work. If I won a place in the V:TES rael world house I would use the experience to compaign for world peace. thank you. mattgreen. * Shut it Coupe. -- Posted via Mailgate.ORG Server - http://www.Mailgate.ORG

"James Coupe" <ja...@zephyr.org.uk> wrote in message news:fgXzz$SBNRY...@gratiano.zephyr.org.uk... > In message <9e10847c.02020...@posting.google.com>, hamdamcwa > <dave...@hotmail.com> writes: > >OK, I've bypassed most of the suggestions that followed, since they > >seemed predominantly Americanised in selection (with the expection of > >James Coupe, who must be feeling like a pig in mud at some of the > >suggestions...). > > I like the suggestion that involved me, Matt Green, Derek Ray and Xian. > > *cackle* I leave the group alone for _one day_ to go to an entomology conference only to come back and find i've been virtually shacked-up with Coupe in some sick, twisted scheme. The highlight for me would be the ritual burning of Xian's Tremere decks. :) mattgreen [ quoted text not captured ]

In message <ee40dd7247dc2c106a0...@mygate.mailgate.org>, Matt Green <mgre...@bcuc.ac.uk> writes: >Well Noal, I'm 5'11", single and from southeast England. My vital >statistics are 38-30-32 and i look pretty buff in a swim suit.* Well, having seen you in your leathers, rubbing your hands with glee asking to be greased up is a pretty frightening sight, too. [ quoted text not captured ]

In message <c5254fa97fa1576983c...@mygate.mailgate.org>, Matt Green <mgre...@bcuc.ac.uk> writes: >I leave the group alone for _one day_ to go to an entomology conference >only to come back and find i've been virtually shacked-up with Coupe in >some sick, twisted scheme. *smooch* [ quoted text not captured ]

"Matt Green" <mgre...@bcuc.ac.uk> wrote in message news:c5254fa97fa1576983c...@mygate.mailgate.org... > I leave the group alone for _one day_ to go to an entomology conference > only to come back and find i've been virtually shacked-up with Coupe in > some sick, twisted scheme. Huh. James showed me a copy (he said there were about 20, secreted in various safe places) of the document with which you signed your body over to him. Surely it couldn't have been a forgery? :) > The highlight for me would be the ritual burning of Xian's Tremere > decks. :) Unfortunately, they have already been pre-Matt Green proofed, and each card is encased in a centimeter thick layer of fireproof lexan. Makes 'em a bitch to play with, but I figured it was worth the investment. :) Xian

"Nystulc" <nys...@cs.com> wrote in message news:20020207050035...@mb-fr.news.cs.com... [snip] > I was forced to clarify that this was certainly not true in my case, and > probably not in yours either, since you had not in fact attempted to make a > ruling against deal-keeping. I was trying to clarify that you had done nothing > inappropriate either way. Oh good. I hoped you weren't upset with what happened there. > BTW, I had great fun at the tournament. Many thanks. Glad to hear it! And you're welcome. Come back anytime. :-) Josh used to hang out a lot around there

"LSJ" <vte...@white-wolf.com> wrote in message news:3C61ABA7...@white-wolf.com... > Joshua Duffin wrote: > > For one thing, in VTES it's not really feasible > > to cooperate for the entire game with another player. > > ? > I've seen it happen more often than defection. No, I meant an entire game of VTES, not a game as in one short-term deal. (You don't see people cooperate for entire VTES games - all the way to the end - do you?) > > (One of you has to get ousted for the game to end, > > barring a mutual-withdrawal pact, and even then you're > > still competing to win the game.) That is, there are > > Ah. Then you don't make the deal. > I was refering to cooperate/defect in terms of deal-making. > Any deal is a "game" in which you cooperate by keeping your > end of the deal and defect by not. Right. > > If, for example, player A offers player B, his prey, > > a deal that A won't oust B on his next turn, in > > return for B using his Bum's Rushes on his own prey > > instead of on A, it's then in A's interest (once B > > doesn't rush him) to go ahead and oust B anyway (if > > it's in his power to do so). The ability to have > > Not if this impairs his ability to make deals with the > other players (with the assumption that there would > be opportunities to make beneficial deals with the > other players). I'm not sure how you can make deals with the other players that'll get you something better than a VP. If you're looking at a multiple-VTES-game horizon, you might expect to be able to make beneficial deals with the other players in later games that could add up to more than this one current VP, but again, I don't think those deals *will* add up to more than a VP unless people are actually "paying back favors" or (truly) colluding across (VTES) games. > Besides, most deals don't involve the "oust-on-defect" > trait. People not infrequently attempt such deals in VTES games that I've seen. (At least, they used to. I rarely see them anymore with my usual playgroup, because no one trusts anyone to not defect when that means a VP. :-) Deals that don't get anyone ousted on a defection have (IMO) a lot more incentive to not defect, exactly because you probably don't gain anything by defecting that's worth the reduction in ability to make future deals. (IOW, for those kind of deals, I agree with your/the prisoner's dilemma-type analysis.) > > This is still not to say that A couldn't keep the > > deal and not oust B. It's just that in my opinion, > > it's almost never *truly* worthwhile for him to do > > so. > > So B should weigh that in making the deal (and in > not defecting) in the first place. Of course. That's the point I've been trying to convey. :-) > > The downside of being known as a "dealbreaker" > > under those circumstances doesn't outweigh getting > > even a single VP - being known as a "dealkeeper" > > will never actually gain you VPs unless people are > > outright paying you back for favors you've done > > them in other games - and that I do think is not > > legal under VEKN tournament rules. > > Paying back favors? No. > Making (and honoring) deals (or not) based on some idea > of trustworthiness of a given player (which may be > impacted by a reputation as a deal-breaker)? Yes. Good, then my understanding is accurate. :-) Josh not that i would *ever* break a deal. no. that would be *wrong*. remember that if i'm ever in a (vtes) game with you, all who are reading this. :-)

LSJ writes (re prisoner's dilemma) >Knowing that the process will be iterated, the player that goes >second would do well to coorperate (in order to "buy" a spirit >of cooperation in his partner for the next time). >Any time iteration is not a factor, both partners should defect >(going first, second, or simultaneous being moot). Although the iteration does not have to be with the same player. Even if later iterations occur with other players, a good reputation can help you make deals. The effect is somewhat less direct than the standard 2-person dilemma, but I've seen some recent posting claiming that people have built-in "defector punishment" tendencies, and this may make up for the indirection when dealing with other human beings. Curt Adams (curt...@aol.com) "It is better to be wrong than to be vague" - Freeman Dyson

>Although the iteration does not have to be with the same >player. Even if later iterations occur with other players, >a good reputation can help you make deals. The effect is >somewhat less direct than the standard 2-person dilemma, >but I've seen some recent posting claiming that people have >built-in "defector punishment" tendencies, and this may >make up for the indirection when dealing with other >human beings. Of course people are going to have some tendencies, but this is sort of inevitable. Which of the two would you rather make a deal with: A.) Someone who has consistently honored deals even though doing so has been, on occassion, a detriment to him B.) Someone who regularly breaks deals ("defects") at the slightest opportunity if it'll benefit him. I think even the most objective person would have a hard time saying that he would *not* prefer to make a deal with A over B. As a result, there is a nearly insurmountable obstacle for those who would choose to (regularly) break deals if it is in their best interest. Even if the VEKN rules prevent betrayed players from directly getting revenge, there is no way to prevent that betrayal from affecting their future decisions days, weeks, months, or years from now... Just my $0.02. Halcyan 2

jtdu...@yahoo.com writes: >For one thing, in VTES it's not really feasible >to cooperate for the entire game with another player. >That is, there are >(IMO) no deals in VTES that in the long-term can be >good for everybody (though there may be some in the >short term). Or, my take is that the payoffs in VTES >are such that cooperating every time (or playing the >tit-for-tat strategy) is not a recipe for winning. You can make deals with a stochastic final outcome. So, 2 player agree to oust the other players 2 and 1, allow 6 points of bleed from the player with fewer ousts, and then go at it for the win. Or you could flip a coin, but I find that less satisfying somehow. True, you can't make deals with the whole table, only some at a time. But a good rep for keeping deals will help you make them in the future. I.e., tit-for-tat with your deal partners, not everybody. [ quoted text not captured ]

>> I like the suggestion that involved me, Matt Green, Derek Ray and Xian. >> >> *cackle* > >I leave the group alone for _one day_ to go to an entomology conference >only to come back and find i've been virtually shacked-up with Coupe in >some sick, twisted scheme. Sorry Matt. I guess I'm guilty of thinking up this twisted scenario. But you gotta admit that it has some marketing potential. Imagine the antics and scandal that would occur in the billiards room, the communal showers, or the hot tub! Not to mention the room specially set aside just for posters of Aurora... Who couldn't resist watching a show about a bunch of drunk gamers fighting over a card game after unsuccessfully trying to find some gamer girlz? VTES at its worst! =P Halcyan 2

> There's no rule to understand here. There are no rules for > negotiations, deals, threats, propaganda, etc. That's why, if you're > playing the game strictly, they are not allowed. > > LSJ appears to have some personal rules for this but hasn't troubled > to put them in the rulebook and therefore, so far as the official game > is concerned, they don't exist. > > You will, of course, find that in practise judges will tell you that > you can or can't do certain things. For example, if you whisper or > gesticulate to another player, this may or may not be allowed. But > this has no basis in the rules - they just make this stuff up > according to their personal taste. Their taste usually seems to be an > environment of honest dealing - where players make open public deals > and always keep their word. This is wildly inappropriate for Vampire > because: > > a) the World of Darkness background is one of inhuman monsters, secret > conspiracies and Machiavellian intrigue. There are no good guys in > this world - even the Society of Leopold is corrupt. Trading on your > real-world, personal reputation rather than adopting the role of an > evil Methusaleh destroys the role-playing feel of the game - an > important element of the design. > > b) the game's designer, Richard Garfield, made it clear that he didn't > want player interaction to be the stereotyped > whining/finger-pointing/bash-the-leader dynamic which would reduce a > multi-player game to a simple model, just as NCL focussed decks reduce > the game to rock/scissors/paper. He analysed these outcomes in > another article which I should perhaps reproduce. Vampire was > supposed to solve this by forcing players to concentrate upon ousting > their prey. Binding deals are often used to subvert this design aim > and so they are not just ultra vires, they are actually bad for the > game. > > <IGNORES ANDREW> Tony Literary Thug

[ quoted text not captured ] The typical VTES deal is an asymmetric game because the players take their actions openly and sequentially. For the player who goes first it's a stag hunt because the payoff for defection is not greater than the payoff for mutual cooperation. For the player who goes second, it's a degenerate form of the prisoner's dilemma because defecting is a no-brainer when you can already see that the other player has cooperated. The general situation is additionally complicated because the players also have the option of dealing with other players or not dealing at all and so there are usually more than two choices. I like the following analysis of the simple situation which comes from The Prisoner's Dilemma by William Poundstone. Andrew ------------------------------------------------------------------ "In 1966, Melvin J. Guyer and Anatol Rapoport, then both at the University of Michigan, catalogued all the simple games. The simplest true games have two players making a choice between two alternatives. It is reasonable to think that these "2 x 2" games ought to be particularly important and common. The prisoner's dilemma and chicken are 2 x 2 games, of course. There are seventy-eight distinct 2 x 2 games when payoffs are simply ranked rather than assigned numerical values. A symmetric game is one where the payoffs are the same for each player under comparable circumstances - where neither player is in a privileged position. If player A is the lone cooperator, his payoff is the same as player B's would be if he was the lone cooperator, and so forth. Symmetric games are the easiest to understand, and probably the most important in social interactions. People are much the same the world over. No conflicts are so common or so bitter as those between people wanting the same thing. So let's look at the symmetric games. There are just four payoffs to worry about in a symmetric 2 x 2 game. Let "CC" be the payoff, to each of the two players, when both cooperate. "DD" is the payoff when both defect. When one player cooperates and the other defects, the payoff to the lone cooperator will be called "CD," and the payoff to the lone defector, "DC." All the variety of 2 x 2 symmetric games rests in the relative values of the four payoffs CC, DD, CD, and DC. As usual, let's have the players rank them in order of preference (and they must agree on the ranking, it being a symmetric game). Let's further assume that there are no "ties," that there is always a distinct preference between any two payoffs. Any given preference ordering of the four payoffs defines a game. For instance, when DC>CC>DD>CD - meaning that the DC outcome is preferred to CC, which is preferred to DD, which is preferred to CD - the game is a prisoner's dilemma. (The usual further requirement, that the average of the DC and CD payoffs be less than the CC payoff, applies only when players hare assigned numerical values to the payoffs. Here we're just ranking them.) There are twenty-four possible rankings of four payoffs, and thus twenty-four symmetric 2 x 2 games. Not all are dilemmas. In most, the correct strategy is obvious. The disturbing thing about the prisoner's dilemma and chicken is the way that the common good is subverted by individual rationality. Each player desires the other's cooperation, yet is tempted to defect himself. Let's see what this means in general terms. The payoff CC must be preferred to CD. That means that you're better off when your partner returns your cooperation. Also, DC must be better than DD. You still hope the other player cooperates, even when you yourself defect. Of the twenty-four possible orderings of four payoffs, exactly half have the CC payoff higher than the CD payoff. Likewise, exactly half have DC preferred to DD. Just six of the possible orderings simultaneously meet both requirements. The six look like this: CC>CD>DC>DD CC>DC>CD>DD CC>DC>DD>CD DC>CC>CD>DD DC>CC>DD>CD DC>DD>CC>CD Not all of these are troublesome. If defection is bad all around, everyone will avoid it. For a true dilemma to exist, there must be a temptation to defect - otherwise, why defect? In the prisoner's dilemma, there is every temptation to defect. No matter what the other player does, you are better off defecting. The temptation need not be that acute to pose a dilemma. You may have a hunch what the other player is going to do, and know it is in your advantage to defect provided the hunch is right. This could cause you to defect, even though there may be no incentive to defect if your hunch is wrong. We require, then, that either of two conditions be met. Either there is an incentive to defect when the other player cooperates (DC>CC), or there is an incentive to defect when the other player defects (DD>CD) - or both. This rules out two of the games above. With the payoffs ordered CC>CD>DC>DD or CC>DC>CD>DD, there is no incentive to defect at all. Not only is mutual cooperation the best possible outcome, but a player is guaranteed to do better by cooperating, no matter what the other player does. Crossing these two games off the list leaves just four games. Each is important enough to rate a name. DC>DD>CC>CD Deadlock DC>CC>DD>CD Prisoner's Dilemma DC>CC>CD>DD Chicken CC>DC>DD>CD Stag Hunt All four are common games in real-life interactions. For that reason they are called "social dilemmas." All are closely related, too. Each of the other three games can be derived from the prisoner's dilemma by switching two of the payoffs in the order of preference. You can think of the prisoner's dilemma as a center of gravity around which the others orbit. Chicken is a prisoner's dilemma with punishment and sucker payoffs reversed. The stag hunt is the prisoner's dilemma with the preferences of the reward and temptation payoffs switched. Deadlock is a prisoner's dilemma with the reward and punishment payoffs switched. ASYMMETRIC GAMES The social dilemmas described above [Deadlock, Stag Hunt] are symmetric games in which both players share the same preferences. Preferences need not match, however. It is possible for one player's preferences to be those of a prisoner's dilemma and the other player's preferences to be those of chicken or stag hunt or something else. Some of these hybrid games have been suggested as models for human conflicts. The game of bully is a cross between chicken and deadlock. One player has the same preferences as a chicken player. He would like to defect, but fears mutual defection. The other player has the deadlock preferences and prefers to defect no matter what (preferably with the other player cooperating). These two sets of preferences describe a game that looks like this: Deadlock Player: Cooperate Defect Chicken Player: Cooperate 2,1 1,3 Defect 3,0 0,2 One instance of bully is the biblical tale demonstrating the wisdom of King Solomon (1 Kings 3:16-28). Two women claim the same child as their own. One is the real mother, and the other is an impostor. Solomon proposes splitting the child in two. Hearing this horrific suggestion, one woman abandons her claim to the child. Solomon awards the child to that woman. The real mother would love her child so much she would give it up to save its life. In other words, the true mother has the preferences of a chicken player. The knife is poised over the child. The dilemma is whether to stand firm (defect) or give in (cooperate). The real mother most wants to prevail - to stand firm on her claim while the impostor backs down. The worst outcome from the real mother's standpoint is for neither woman to give in. Then the child is cut in two. The impostor has deadlock preferences. She evidently would rather see the child killed than have it go to her rival. The name "bully" tells what happens. The deadlock player can be a bully and defect. The chicken player is powerless to prevent this. The only thing she can do is cut her losses by cooperating. Ergo, the woman who gives in is the real mother. Bully is a model for military confrontations in which one nation prefers to start a war, and the other views the war as a catastrophe to be avoided at all costs. To the extent this is an accurate model, the conclusion is gloomy. The belligerent nation will likely get its way, while the conciliatory nation is exploited to maintain the peace. The prognosis is probably worse yet. Real nations' preferences are fluid, and a nation that feels it has been exploited may decide that war isn't so bad after all."

On 08 Feb 2002 01:31:42 GMT, CurtAdams wrote: >Although the iteration does not have to be with the same >player. Even if later iterations occur with other players, >a good reputation can help you make deals. The effect is >somewhat less direct than the standard 2-person dilemma, >but I've seen some recent posting claiming that people have >built-in "defector punishment" tendencies, and this may >make up for the indirection when dealing with other >human beings. There's an interesting article in the latest Scientific American which details experiments showing that humans don't evaluate deals in a simple numeric way. It's well understood now that our genes program us for altruistic, co-operative behaviour because that maximises the genes' fitness - they don't care much about the individual. That's why people get angry when something is not fair - the emotional over-reaction is a rational strategy when viewed from an evolutionary perspective. But engaging these impulses in a game is wrong - hence the common phrase, "it's only a game". Andrew

On Wed, 06 Feb 2002 17:18:15 -0500, LSJ wrote: >Paying back favors? No. Helping another player to win seems like a big favour to me. It seems obvious that rush decks do this on the implicit understanding that the favour will be returned when the roles are reversed in a future game. One doesn't need game theory to understand that "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours" is profitable. Or that it is collusion. >Making (and honoring) deals (or not) based on some idea >of trustworthiness of a given player (which may be >impacted by a reputation as a deal-breaker)? Yes. So that what happens in a game is not just based upon the game itself, it is also based upon conversations which took place prior to that game. Collusion. Andrew

On 06 Feb 2002 15:01:11 GMT, Nystulc wrote: >Then you recall something that I do not. When have we had previous debate? I >suspect you mistake me for someone else, or else this was very long ago. I discussed this matter with another John Whelan here in September 2000. >Or he might only break his word when it is given to strangers whom >he does not expect to play again with any regularity. I plan to play in LA next week. I was there last year but these are literally flying visits. Last year I observed that the players split on geographic lines - LA vs San Diego. I'm from London and so expect to be discriminated against as you indicate. >But my attitude is ... the stakes are NEVER high. Indeed - that's why I'm prepared to play VTES with people like you who openly admit to colluding in a systematic way. I wouldn't play poker with people who approached the game in the same way - there would be money at stake. >It is the very nature of evil that it must prey on good to gain any advantage. >Treachery, to be valuable, must prey on trust. If you outlaw good, there is >nothing for Evil to take advantage of, and no possibility of Treachery. An ingenious argument. But I'm not observing any treachery at the moment; all the players seem terrified of the consequences - vengeance, ostracism, etc. They treat deals as if they were a formal game mechanic - solemn and binding. The PTB support this by repeatedly saying that keeping your word is more important than trying to win the game. This is not the World of Darkness - it's the Boy Scouts of America. Andrew

[ quoted text not captured ] Incorrect. There is no a priori arrangement => no collusion. At any rate, it is impossible (not merely difficult) to regulate how players evaluate trustworthiness of other players, assuming one would want to (which, IMO, is a bad idea to begin with). [ quoted text not captured ]

[ quoted text not captured ] Ah, but you forget that there are 3 important factors that can drastically alter the results of these basic models for Game Theory (Prisoner's Dilemma, Stag Hunt, etc.) 1. Is it possible to determine if a player has defected? 2. If a player has defected, is there any way the other player can punish him/her for the defection? 3. Is there repeated play? Because all of these are a "yes" in the case of Jyhad/VTES (especially the case of repeated play and the fact that repeated play doesn't necessarily have to be with the same person to have the same effect here), the models (such as Prisoner's Dilemma) aren't exactly accurate. This means that there is a much higher cost of defecting (in general) and a much higher benefit of cooperating (in general). Halcyan 2

Andrew S. Davidson wrote: [ quoted text not captured ] I see what you're aiming at, and I don't agree. Of course there is a gray scale, which makes it pointless and hopeless to try measuring it. However I'll provide you with an example from one end of the scale: In league soccer you're not allowed to take actions that would make you lose the game. We've probably all read about punishments for teams who have done this. I'm of course talking about actions done on purpose. During a match one of your players is damaged. The opposing team kicks the ball over the line, your player gets medical treatment and when the match starts again the ball is thrown in and immediately kicked over to the opposing team. Both teams have by this time on purpose given away the ball to the opposing team and neither will be punished for breaking the rules. What is more important - if your team does not pass the ball to the opposing team when the match starts again you risk punishment for unsportmanslike behaviour. In the extreme case above the term 'unsportmanslike behaviour' is actually enforced in the rules, but going through the rules for soccer you won't find any rules for 'sportmanslike behaviour' or in what way it's forbidden to score goals in your own goal, etc etc. We simply accept that certain behaviour is - well acceptable, and in the most extreme cases we enforce 'nice attitude' in the rules. You prefer to call this collusion, and by your definition you're correct. It's definitely collusion. It's collusion the same way that I'd be guilty of it during a tournament round in London when I'm hunting another player from Sweden - and the moment we handle combat between two of our vampires in the english language we are guilty of collusion as we're actively raising the risk for misunderstandings and thus lowering our chance to win the game. With your definition of collusion both of us should be warned because we don't use the most effective means of communication when handling a matter that doesn't concern the other players. Know what? I prefer being guilty of collusion - every game I participate in. Sten During

In message <A0AC1DF694850F39.6D199D02...@lp.airnew s.net>, Andrew S. Davidson <a...@csi.com> writes: >There's an interesting article in the latest Scientific American which >details experiments showing that humans don't evaluate deals in a >simple numeric way. And? Lots of people don't evaluate lots of things in a simple numeric fashion. Most usually, this involves probability. [ quoted text not captured ]

ztr...@yahoo.com (Tony) wrote in message news:<19048d48.02020...@posting.google.com>... [ quoted text not captured ] Passes time of day with Tony with back turned to andrew

"CurtAdams" <curt...@aol.com> wrote in message news:20020207204511...@mb-ba.aol.com... > jtdu...@yahoo.com writes: > > >For one thing, in VTES it's not really feasible > >to cooperate for the entire [VTES] game with another player. > You can make deals with a stochastic final outcome. > So, 2 player agree to oust the other players 2 and > 1, allow 6 points of bleed from the player with fewer > ousts, and then go at it for the win. Or you could > flip a coin, but I find that less satisfying somehow. If you try to make this deal with one other player, the remaining three players will probably form a coalition against the two of you, don't you think? And if they do that, your deal's not likely to work out the way you want it to. > True, you can't make deals with the whole table, only > some at a time. But a good rep for keeping deals will > help you make them in the future. I.e., tit-for-tat > with your deal partners, not everybody. Sounds cliquey. And unsportsmanlike, if not actually collusive. To me, at least. (If I read you correctly that you're saying a VTES player could play tit-for-tat cooperation with certain people who are her deal partners, ignoring the others who are the victims of these deals.) Josh how many diplomacy players consider their deals matters of "honor"? and why is that?

Andrew writes: >That's >why people get angry when something is not fair - the emotional >over-reaction is a rational strategy when viewed from an evolutionary >perspective. But engaging these impulses in a game is wrong - hence >the common phrase, "it's only a game". So let people do what they want to do! It's only a game ;-) [ quoted text not captured ]

jtdu...@yahoo.com writes: >If you try to make this deal with one other player, >the remaining three players will probably form a >coalition against the two of you, don't you think? >And if they do that, your deal's not likely to work >out the way you want it to. Yes, only sometimes do two players even have the option to split the table, and they must always consider what the other palyers might do or they've made a bad deal. That said, it's not too unusual for 2 vote or combat decks to be able to split a table. >Sounds cliquey. And unsportsmanlike, if not actually >collusive. To me, at least. (If I read you correctly >that you're saying a VTES player could play tit-for-tat >cooperation with certain people who are her deal partners, >ignoring the others who are the victims of these deals.) You should play tit-for-tat-ish strategy with people you make a deal with. That in itself doesn't restrict who you make deals with. It is inevitably true that you should generally trust people in your play group more as it's more costly for them to stab you in terms of retaliation and rep. [ quoted text not captured ]

Andrew S. Davidson <a...@csi.com> wrote in message > >Or he might only break his word when it is given to strangers whom > >he does not expect to play again with any regularity. > > I plan to play in LA next week. I was there last year but these are > literally flying visits. Last year I observed that the players split > on geographic lines - LA vs San Diego. I'm from London and so expect > to be discriminated against as you indicate. Not by me. I always keep my deals. But then I might "discriminate" against you in the sense of avoiding risky deals with you, as you are evidently bound by principle to break them. This seems common sense to me, but it would probably not have much effect in the context of a particular game. In general, I prefer to play based on lay of the table, without regard to who is sitting in what chair. > But I'm not observing any treachery at the > moment; all the players seem terrified of the consequences - > vengeance, ostracism, etc. They treat deals as if they were a formal > game mechanic - solemn and binding. This is not a phenomenon I am familiar with. All the players around here seem to accept that treachery is a part of the game, and that any Methuselah who relies on good faith does so at his own risk and has a responsibility to accept the consequences. But then again, I come from New York City. Perhaps things are more "boyscoutish" in your area. Twice I have been badly damaged in tournaments because I relied on a promise made in bad faith. In each case I accepted that I had been beaten fair and square under the rules, and that it had been my own error in judgment that led to my defeat. (Incidentally, neither of these "defectors" were from my local playgroup, which is perhaps why smarter persons than myself evidence the sort of cliquish alliance-making that you so abhor). I have never seen vengeance nor ostracism that carries over from game to game. I have seen examples of unsportsmanlike vengeance within particular games, usually by players who did not stick around as part of the play-group. > The PTB support this by > repeatedly saying that keeping your word is more important than trying > to win the game. This is not the World of Darkness - it's the Boy > Scouts of America. I am not sure who these Powers-That-Be are or what sort of experiences you have had in tournaments. I am curious as to details, as it seems so vastly at odds with my own. I have this image of my head of a Tournament Judge standing over you with Bible in hand threatening you with hellfire, but perhaps you can paint a more plausible picture. For myself, I am happy to affirm that you have every right to break your deals, and still be treated with all the courtesy due a respected player. No one should take any vengeance or ostracism on you, though your should expect, in all fairness, that folks will be reluctant to make risky deals with you that they might make with others. You have a policy and a strategy which has both advantages and disadvantages. So do I. I believe mine has benefits, but it undeniably has cost me as well. But you seem to want to outlaw my strategy, so that you don't have to feel bad about following yours. This seems childish to me. Play the way you want to. It is perfectly legal, proper, and correct, ... and no one can stop you. -- John Whelan

On 09 Feb 2002 02:05:55 GMT, CurtAdams wrote: >That said, it's not too unusual for 2 vote >or combat decks to be able to split a table. Indeed - this is what happened in the first game I played at the London storyline event. I didn't hear a deal being made (it was noisy) but two rush decks were sat next to each other; one helped his prey to win and then withdrew from the game. AFAIC they were cheating. >You should play tit-for-tat-ish strategy with people you >make a deal with. That in itself doesn't restrict who you >make deals with. It is inevitably true that you should >generally trust people in your play group more as it's >more costly for them to stab you in terms of retaliation >and rep. And you'd trust your blood relations even more. Happy Families, eh? And "Tit for Tat" is not what happens. You don't get an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma because the typical response to a defection is to refuse to deal again and so the series terminates after one defection. Instead you are likely to get anger, vengeance and feud. We saw this prior to one UK championship where a player went around all his friends and blackened the reputation of another. More blatant collusion. >>why people get angry when something is not fair - the emotional >>over-reaction is a rational strategy when viewed from an evolutionary >>perspective. But engaging these impulses in a game is wrong - hence >>the common phrase, "it's only a game". > >So let people do what they want to do! It's only a game ;-) If players let their emotions have full rein then I think you'll find you have a fist-fight, not a game - I've seen it happen. I get angry myself when players collude but I'm not built for brawling. Instead, as the saying goes, "don't get mad, get even". If these games are all to be played as one huge metagame, then I should also carry my list of grudges with me from game to game and seek to settle scores by punishing those who offend me. Is this "tit for tat" really what you want? Andrew

In message <C7508A96EEC185C2.6BCF0750...@lp.airnew s.net>, Andrew S. Davidson <a...@csi.com> writes: >Indeed - this is what happened in the first game I played at the >London storyline event. I didn't hear a deal being made (it was >noisy) but two rush decks were sat next to each other; one helped his >prey to win and then withdrew from the game. AFAIC they were >cheating. And the judge you called over ruled in which fashion? And as you say, you didn't hear a deal being made - which isn't the same as one not being made. [ quoted text not captured ]

a...@csi.com writes: >Indeed - this is what happened in the first game I played at the >London storyline event. I didn't hear a deal being made (it was >noisy) but two rush decks were sat next to each other; one helped his >prey to win and then withdrew from the game. AFAIC they were >cheating. That would be cheating in a tournament setting. The deal should improve *both* players expectations of a win (or VPs) in that particular game. >And "Tit for Tat" is not what happens. You don't get an iterated >Prisoner's Dilemma because the typical response to a defection is to >refuse to deal again and so the series terminates after one defection. Oh, that's a very dumb strategy. The proper response is either to refuse to deal once or twice or continue to stab back sometime. (due to the nature of stabbing, you can't just do it the next time) >Instead you are likely to get anger, vengeance and feud. Dunno what to do about that. Obnoxious or incompetent players do poorly and create trouble - that's life. It might help to teach them something about making and breaking deals. >We saw this >prior to one UK championship where a player went around all his >friends and blackened the reputation of another. More blatant >collusion. That's either deception or information-passing. If you consider obtaining information on how somebody else plays "collusion", you've got a strange definition. And is this the sort of boyscoutish behavior you say deals lead to? > If these games are all >to be played as one huge metagame, then I should also carry my list of >grudges with me from game to game and seek to settle scores by >punishing those who offend me. Is this "tit for tat" really what you >want? If I'm playing against you, sure! It'll cripple your play by introducing goals other than winning. But I do my best to be aware of what other players do and recognize they're doing the same to me. That creates a tit-for-tat-ish situation (as opposed to vengeance, etc). I can't possibly expect other players to be blind or foolish. [ quoted text not captured ]

Tony wrote: > <IGNORES ANDREW> > > Tony > > Literary Thug Smart man. Raille

"CurtAdams" <curt...@aol.com> wrote in message news:20020208210555...@mb-cg.aol.com... > Yes, only sometimes do two players even have the > option to split the table, and they must always consider > what the other palyers might do or they've made a > bad deal. That said, it's not too unusual for 2 vote > or combat decks to be able to split a table. It can happen sometimes. It seems to me a cavalier assumption that the other three decks won't be stronger as a collective than the first two. Vote and combat decks can both be quite strong working as a two-man team, but they don't inherently have any defense against the other three players' vote or combat or bleed. (they may have some defense built into their decks but it's not there just by virtue of being a vote or combat deck.) Anyway - I feel kinda like we're going around in circles now, so I'll just point out that we have anti-collusion rules (in tournaments) to keep people from setting up their teams before a game starts, and within a game everybody's required to play for their *own* win, not a team win. > You should play tit-for-tat-ish strategy with people you > make a deal with. That in itself doesn't restrict who you > make deals with. It is inevitably true that you should > generally trust people in your play group more as it's > more costly for them to stab you in terms of retaliation > and rep. Rep maybe. I'd say that in terms of retaliation it's about the same, unless people are (IMO foolishly) carrying over "grudges" from one game to another. Josh exterminate. exterminate.

jtdu...@yahoo.com writes: >"CurtAdams" <curt...@aol.com> wrote in message >news:20020208210555...@mb-cg.aol.com... >> Yes, only sometimes do two players even have the >> option to split the table, and they must always consider >> what the other palyers might do or they've made a >> bad deal. That said, it's not too unusual for 2 vote >> or combat decks to be able to split a table. >It can happen sometimes. It seems to me a cavalier >assumption that the other three decks won't be >stronger as a collective than the first two. It would be, and I'm not making it. "only *sometimes* do they even have the option" >Anyway - I feel kinda like we're going around in >circles now, so I'll just point out that we have >anti-collusion rules (in tournaments) to keep people >from setting up their teams before a game starts, >and within a game everybody's required to play for >their *own* win, not a team win. Righto. In my original deal description, I mentioned that a legal table split deal requires a win-determining method after the deal is successful which gives each player a reasonable chance (judged from when the deal is made) and suggested a Monomancy-like method for combat decks. >>It is inevitably true that you should >> generally trust people in your play group more as it's >> more costly for them to stab you in terms of retaliation >> and rep. >Rep maybe. I'd say that in terms of retaliation it's >about the same, unless people are (IMO foolishly) >carrying over "grudges" from one game to another. No, in a tournament you're unlikely to get a chance to retribute against the same player - you need a deal opportunity, a deal, and a *good* stab opportunity, plus you need the option to delay the counterstab past the first chance so it's properly surprising. You will get this against somebody in your own playgroup eventually. I haven't looked up the details, but I think the end results of rep-driven and retaliation-driven cooperation aren't quite the same. With rep-driven cooperation you just need a rep of stabbing rarely; people will then still want to make deals with you and will stab at a frequency appropriate for their own desired reputation. Optimal strategy would IMO require an occaisional stab, when it's really good for you. With retaliation-driven it's usually a good strategy to*never* stab except in retaliation, and even then to be a bit forgiving. [ quoted text not captured ]

"CurtAdams" <curt...@aol.com> wrote in message news:20020211185439...@mb-mv.aol.com... > jtdu...@yahoo.com writes: > > >It can happen sometimes. It seems to me a cavalier > >assumption that the other three decks won't be > >stronger as a collective than the first two. > > It would be, and I'm not making it. "only *sometimes* do > they even have the option" OK, good. :-) > Righto. In my original deal description, I mentioned that > a legal table split deal requires a win-determining method after > the deal is successful which gives each player a reasonable > chance (judged from when the deal is made) and suggested > a Monomancy-like method for combat decks. Fair enough. Still likely to leave a bad taste in the other players' mouths, when this can be pulled off. > >Rep maybe. I'd say that in terms of retaliation it's > >about the same, unless people are (IMO foolishly) > >carrying over "grudges" from one game to another. > > No, in a tournament you're unlikely to get a chance > to retribute against the same player - you need > a deal opportunity, a deal, and a *good* stab > opportunity, plus you need the option to delay the > counterstab past the first chance so it's properly > surprising. You will get this against somebody in > your own playgroup eventually. You mean that you'll get a chance for retribution against someone in your playgroup eventually because you'll play lots of games with them in the future? True enough, but that *does* mean you're "holding grudges" across games. Why, then, are you doing it? What do you gain beyond the gain you'd always get from such a stab? Is it to "teach them a lesson" so that they don't stab you as often in the future? Is that even ethical? If your motive in stabbing is something other than the immediate benefits, are you really playing to win? (True, you're not required to play to win in casual games, but I think most players consider it unsportsmanlike to not play to win even then.) (If the stab helps you win, then sure you're playing to win, but then why wouldn't you have stabbed regardless of the stab you're exacting retribution for? Does it damage your reputation among your playgroup less if your stab is perceived to be "retributive" or something?) If we're talking about retaliating in games other than the one where the original stab occurred, then yes, I can see that you'll have more opportunities to retaliate against people you play with regularly, but I don't see how this is a good thing, or really beneficial. If your point is that you can expect the people you usually play with to keep their deals more often because they know if they don't they'll be subject to this kind of retaliation, that too may be true but it feels kinda like blackmail to me to threaten this and follow through on it. > I haven't looked up the details, but I think the end results > of rep-driven and retaliation-driven cooperation aren't > quite the same. With rep-driven cooperation you just > need a rep of stabbing rarely; people will then still > want to make deals with you and will stab at a frequency > appropriate for their own desired reputation. Optimal > strategy would IMO require an occaisional stab, when > it's really good for you. With retaliation-driven it's > usually a good strategy to*never* stab except in > retaliation, and even then to be a bit forgiving. Now I'm (again) not sure if we're speaking theoretically or in practice. :-) I would assume that in most tournaments deal-making and -keeping will be driven by reputation rather than retaliation - since, as you say, there aren't enough opportunities for retaliation. Whether that inevitably leads to your conclusion that you should (for optimal results) usually keep deals but stab when it's really good for you is beyond me. :-) (Though "stab when it gains you a lot" is the same position I've come to through other (not necessarily logically defensible) methods.) Josh insensible?